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I.	  Introduction	  
	  
Apart	   from	   the	   original	   purpose	   of	   European	   integration,	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	   age	   old	   enmity	  
between	   Germany	   and	   France,	   which	   has	   been	   successfully	   implemented	   by	   means	   of	   economic	  
technocracy,	  there	  is	  yet	  another	  objective	  that	  has	  become	  ever	  more	  important.	  As	  a	  consequence	  
of	  the	  intensity	  of	  European	  cooperation	  in	  economic	  areas,	   it	  has	  been	  a	  broader	  vision	  of	  Europe	  
that	  was	  required,	  rooted	  also	  in	  the	  human	  and	  cultural.1	  Even	  though,	  as	  Weiler	  puts	  it,	  one	  of	  the	  
greatest	  achievements	  has	  been	  to	  shift	  European	  integration	  “from	  something	  that	  Europe	  does	  to	  
something	  that	  Europe	  is”,2	  it	  is	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  togetherness	  of	  the	  European	  peoples	  and	  the	  
objective	  to	  create	  an	  ever	  closer	  union	  among	  them,	  which	  has	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  crucial.	  
	  
One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  could	  have	  constituted	  an	  opportunity	  to	  make	  people	  aware	  
of	   their	   fateful	   common	   bond	   and	   the	   need	   for	   solidarity	   in	   difficult	   times.3	  It	   became	   obvious	  
however	   that	   the	   persistent	   failure	   to	   realize	   solidarity	   among	   European	   citizens	   and	   their	   lacking	  
identification	  with	  the	  European	  idea	  are	  finally	  hindering	  the	  obviously	  needed	  further	   integration	  
in	  economic	  areas.	   Thus,	   the	   limits	   for	  economic	   integration	  are	   rooted	   in	  a	   lack	  of	   corresponding	  
cultural	   and	   social	   cohesion.	   There	   are	  ongoing	   and	   apparently	   insufficient	   efforts	   to	   implement	   a	  
feeling	  of	   togetherness	  and	   solidarity	  among	  EU	  citizens,	   to	  establish	   tolerance,	   to	  deepen	  mutual	  
understanding,	   to	  develop	  a	   sense	  of	  European	   identity	  and	   thus	   to	  create	  a	  political	   space	   that	   is	  
needed	   for	  a	  working	  democracy.	  The	  core	   strategy	   is	   the	   implementation	  of	  European	  citizenship	  
with	   its	  associated	  rights,	  especially	   those	  connected	  to	   free	  movement.	  A	  broad	  understanding	  of	  
these	  legal	  concepts	  is	  certainly	  needed	  to	  make	  people	  identify	  themselves	  with	  the	  Union.	  At	  the	  
same	   time	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	   the	   current	   Treaties	   do	   neither	   envisage	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	  
European	  people,	  a	  demos,	  nor	  do	  they	  provide	  for	  an	  institutional	  framework	  that	  enables	  effective	  
participation	  of	  EU	  citizens	  and	  thus	  allow	  for	  a	  functioning	  sui	  generis	  democratic	  system.	  Therefore,	  
today´s	   Union	   still	   largely	   relies	   on	   the	   democratic	   resources	   of	   its	   Member	   States	   rather	   than	  
realizing	  ist	  own.4	  
	  
The	  ideal	  of	  European	  integration	  to	  preserve	  diversity	  and	  thus	  different	  national	  identities	  within	  a	  
united	   Europe	   is	   famously	   reflected	   by	   the	   preamble	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   European	   Union	   (TEU),	  
determining	  that	  what	  should	  be	  achieved	   is	  an	  “ever	  closer	  union	  among	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe”.	  
Intense	   cooperation,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   preserving	   the	   different	   national	   identities	   of	   the	  
Member	  States,	  entails	  that	  citizens	  still	   identify	  themselves	  with	  their	  national	  constitutions	  in	  the	  
first	   place;	   this	   is	   crucial	   for	   the	   development	   of	   a	   European	   identity	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   enabling	  
identification	   of	   the	   citizens	  with	   the	  Union.	   The	   concept	   of	   constitutional	   pluralism	   that	   is	   at	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Weiler,	  Integration	  through	  fear	  –	  Editorial,	  23	  EJIL	  2012,	  1	  (2).	  
2	  See	  Weiler	  (supra	  note	  1).	  
3	  In	  this	  context	  cf	  the	  concept	  of	  risk	  society,	  Beck,	  German	  Europe,	  2013.	  
4	  Speech	   of	   Prof	   Weiler	   on	   “Democracy	   and	   Limits	   of	   EU	   competence”	   at	   the	   European	   Parliament	   on	  
4.10.2012.	   Outline	   available	   at	  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201210/20121003ATT52863/20121003ATT52863E
N.pdf,	  31	  et	  seq.	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  also	  institutional	  reasons	  for	  the	  “democratic	  deficit”	  in	  the	  EU.	  On	  the	  
link	  between	   the	  democratic	  deficit	   on	   the	  EU	   level	   and	   the	   lack	  of	   a	   European	   identity	   see	  Kumm/Ferreres	  
Comella,	   The	   Future	   of	   Constitutional	   Conflict	   in	   the	   European	   Union:	   Constitutional	   Supremacy	   after	   the	  
Constitutional	  Treaty,	  JMWP	  5/04,	  19	  et	  seq.	  
	   2	  
heart	   of	   the	   Union	   today,	   finds	   its	   normative	   expression	   in	   the	   identity	   clause	   in	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU,5	  
according	   to	  which	   the	  Union	  has	   to	   respect	   the	   identity	   of	   the	  Member	   States	   “inherent	   in	   their	  
fundamental	   structures,	   political	   and	   constitutional“.	   Thus,	   regardless	   of	   common	   stereotypes	   like	  
the	   German	   Oktoberfest,	   the	   Austrian	   Sacher	   Cake	   and	   Viennese	  Waltz,	   Belgian	   Chocolate	   and	  
Spanish	   bullfights,	   at	   the	   latest	   since	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon6	  has	   substantially	   reframed	   the	   identity	  
clause	  and	  subjected	  it	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  CJEU,	  national	  identity	  has	  evolved	  from	  a	  cultural	  to	  
a	  legal	  concept.	  Whereas	  the	  latter	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  controversal	  discussions	  in	  the	  legal	  literature,	  it	  
is	   beyond	   dispute	   that	   the	   scope	   of	   application	   of	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	   triggered	   by	  
domestic	   constitutional	   law.	   State	   constitutions	   reflect	   democratically	   legitimated	   fundamental	  
choices	  of	  a	  people,	  express	  the	  national	  identity	  of	  a	  State	  and	  form	  substantial	  reference	  points	  for	  
the	   identification	   of	   its	   citizens;	   as	   such,	   constitutional	   identity	   is	   prerequisite	   for	   democratic	  
participation.	  
	  
The	  implementation	  of	  free	  movement	  –	  perceived	  as	  a	  means	  to	  realize	  identification	  of	  EU	  citizens	  
with	  the	  Union	  –	  increasingly	  conflicts	  with	  and	  undermines	  the	  fundamental	  constitutional	  choices	  
of	  the	  Member	  States	  by	  enabling	  EU	  citizens	  to	  pick	  and	  choose	  among	  the	  various	   legal	  systems.	  
This	  is	  especially	  true	  for	  fundamental	  rights.	  Even	  though	  today	  the	  Member	  States	  are	  all	  bound	  by	  
an	  increasing	  number	  of	  EU	  rights,	  they	  still	  have	  considerable	  freedom	  to	  shape	  their	  own	  systems	  
of	  fundamental	  rights	  protection.	  Varying	  policies	  regarding	  the	  legality	  of	  abortions,	  gay	  marriages,	  
assisted	  suicides	  and	  surrogacies	  reveal	  that	  there	  is	  room	  left	  for	  fundamental	  and	  different	  choices	  
of	   the	  Member	   States,	   reflecting	   their	   specific	   historical	   and	   cultural	   backgrounds	   and	   thus	   their	  
constitutional	   identities.	   Given	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (ECtHR)	  
that	  –	  by	  means	  of	  its	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  doctrine	  –	  strives	  to	  preserve	  diversity	  in	  human	  rights	  
protection,	   it	   is	   crucial	   that	   the	  Union	   safeguards	   that	   very	   diversity	   too	   by	   paying	   respect	   to	   the	  
Member	  States´	  varying	  preferences	  regarding	  the	  values	  attached	  to	  specific	  rights.	  Thus,	  effective	  
realization	  of	   free	  movement	   requires	   a	  balance	  between	  a	   certain	   level	   of	  uniformity	  on	   the	  one	  
hand	  and	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  different	  national	  constitutional	  identities	  on	  the	  other.	  
	  
The	   present	   analysis	   suggests	   that	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   unterstand	   the	   preservation	   of	   constitutional	  
diversity	   as	   an	   essential	   feature	   of	   the	   specific	   form	   of	   constitutional	   pluralism	   in	   the	   European	  
Union.	  The	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  political	  
community	  is	  prerequesite	  for	  their	  democratic	  participation;	  while	  such	  participation	  does	  not	  exist	  
at	  the	  Union	  level,	  identification	  persists	  all	  the	  more	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  It	  is	  typically	  actuated	  by	  a	  
particular	  and	  substantive	  framing	  of	  national	   identity,	   ie	  of	  a	  particular	   interpretation	  of	  a	  specific	  
fundamental	  right	  in	  correspondance	  with	  the	  historical	  and	  cultural	  background	  of	  a	  people.	  Finally,	  
the	  argument	  is	  one	  of	  political	  legitimacy,	  assuming	  that	  the	  Union´s	  legitimacy	  relies	  still	  first	  and	  
foremost	  on	  pluralist	  democratic	  processes	  within	  the	  Member	  States.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  potential	  
of	   the	   new	   identity	   clause	   is	   established	   as	   a	   trigger	   to	   safeguard	   this	   constitutional	   pluralism	   by	  
judicial	  means,	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   requiring	  a	   rethinking	  of	   the	   role	  of	  national	   constitutional	  
courts	  on	  the	  EU	   level.	  Regardless	  of	   the	  general	  competence	  of	   the	  CJEU	  to	   interpret	  EU	   law,	  the	  
case	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  –	  even	  though	  obviously	  part	  of	  EU	   law	  –	   is	  special,	  as	   it	   requires	  not	  only	  an	  
interpretation	  of	  EU,	  but	  also	  one	  of	  national	   law.	  Hence	  it	   is	  an	  institutionalized	  dialogue	  between	  
national	  and	  European	  courts	  that	  is	  proposed.	  Thereby	  the	  identity	  clause	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Art	   4(2)	   TEU;	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   OJ	   2007	   C	   306,	   consolidated	   version	   in	   OJ	   2012	   C	   326.	   In	   this	   regard	   cf	  
Habermas´	  idea	  of	  constitutional	  patriotism,	  infra	  II.6.	  
6	  OJ	  2007	  C	  306.	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as	   a	   means	   to	   overcome	   strict	   primacy	   of	   EU	   law,	   but	   rather	   as	   one	   that	   lowers	   the	   degree	   of	  
normativity	   of	   those	  provisions	  of	   EU	   law	   that	   are	   encroaching	  on	  national	   constitutional	   identity.	  
This	  understanding	  of	  the	  provision	  could	  strengthen	  the	  Union	  by	  clarifying	  its	  pluralist	  legal	  ground	  
and	   thus	  unwind	   the	  ever-­‐lasting	  discussions	  on	   the	  Union´s	  democratic	  deficit,	  while	  at	   the	   same	  
time	  ensuring	  the	  effet	  utile	  of	  EU	  law.	  Furthermore,	  the	  proposed	  procedure	  would	  address	  national	  
constitutional	   identity	   in	   a	   way	   that	   could	   serve	   both,	   the	   Member	   States	   and	   the	   Union	   by	  
establishing	  a	  new	  form	  of	  dialogue	  and	  cooperation	  among	  the	  European	  and	  the	  national	  judiciary.	  
	  
To	  start	  with,	  the	  different	  meanings	  of	  identity	  and	  their	  importance	  for	  individuals,	  States	  and	  the	  
European	  Union	   are	   analyzed.	   Thereby	   the	  hierarchical	   and	   subsequently	   constitutional	   aspects	   of	  
identity	  as	  well	  as	  its	  significance	  for	  democratic	  processes	  are	  evaluated.	  After	  having	  established	  a	  
link	   between	   identity	   and	   constitutionalism,	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   second	   part	   is	   to	   assess	   more	  
specifically	  what	  should	  be	  covered	  by	  national	  constitutional	  identity	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU.	  
Given	   the	   plurality	   of	   constitutional	   systems	   in	   the	   European	   Union,	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   there	   are	  
three	  relevant	  layers	  of	  (constitutional)	   identity	  in	  place.	  By	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  interrelation	  
among	  those	   three	   layers	  of	   identity	  and	   the	  demarcation	  between	  them,	   the	  concept	  of	  Member	  
States´	   constitutional	   identity	   is	   substantiated.	   Special	   attention	   is	   paid	   to	   the	   question,	   to	   what	  
extent	   human	   rights	   form	   part	   of	   this	   identity.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   so-­‐called	   Günstigkeitsklausel	  
contained	   in	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (CFREU)7	  and	   its	  relation	  to	  
the	  identity	  clause	  is	  of	  particular	  interest.	  After	  having	  critically	  described	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  the	  
CJEU	   on	   the	   issue,	   the	   third	   part	   of	   the	   present	   contribution	   is	   devoted	   to	   potential	   legal	  
consequences	   to	  be	  drawn	   from	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU,	   such	  as	  procedural	  aspects	  and	  a	  possible	  easing	  of	  
absolute	   primacy.	  Giving	   priority	   attention	   to	   the	   rulings	   of	   the	  German	  Bundesverfassungsgericht	  
(BVerfG)	  when	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  other	  national	  constitutional	  courts	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  
this	  court	  that	  first	  mentioned	  the	  concept	  of	  constitutional	  identity	  and	  that	  it	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  
critical	  one.	  In	  a	  final	  step,	  a	  possible	  procedural	  solution	  is	  presented	  that	  could	  help	  to	  exploit	  the	  
maximum	  potential	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  OJ	  2012	  C	  326/393.	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II.	  Identity	  and	  constitutionalism	  
	  
II.1.	  Individual,	  shared	  and	  collective	  identities	  
	  
Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   sets	   forth	   that	   „(t)he	   Union	   shall	   respect	   the	   equality	   of	  Member	   States	   before	   the	  
Treaties	   as	  well	   as	   their	   national	   identities,	   inherent	   in	   their	   fundamental	   structures,	   political	   and	  
constitutional,	   inclusive	   of	   regional	   and	   local	   self-­‐government”;	   it	   is	   far	   from	   clear	   however,	  what	  
should	   be	   regarded	   constitutive	   for	   this	   identity.	   For	   an	   identification	   what	   should	   be	   meant	   by	  
„constitutional	  identity“,	  there	  are	  three	  different	  levels	  of	  identity	  to	  be	  described	  in	  the	  following	  –	  
namely	  individual,	  shared	  and	  collective	  identities.	  
	  
When	  asking	  individuals	  what	  they	  associate	  with	  the	  notion	  identity,	  the	  answer	  typically	  comprises	  
(at	   least	   some	  of)	   the	   following	   criteria:	   origin,	   values,	   character,	   faith,	   family,	   education,	   political	  
attitude	  and	  profession8.	  Thus,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  individual,	  identity	  is	  typically	  associated	  
with	  preferences	   for	  particular	  values,	   specific	  characteristics	  and	  choices	   that	  make	  a	  person.	   It	   is	  
also	  linked	  to	  emotional	  bonds	  and	  experiences,	  be	  it	  with	  specific	  people	  in	  a	  familial,	  a	  communal	  
or	  a	  national	  context,	  be	  it	  with	  specific	  places	  that	  are	  emotionally	  charged,	  be	  it	  with	  education	  or	  
profession.	   These	   are	   criteria	   specific	   to	   each	   and	   every	   single	   person,	   positively	   or	   negatively	  
imprinting	  his	  or	  her	  personality	  and	  can	  be	  subdivided	  into	  those	  that	  are	  predetermined	  and	  those	  
that	  are	  freely	  selectable.	  
	  
The	   capture	   of	   the	   collective	   identity	   of	   a	   political	   community,	   be	   it	   a	   State	   or	   an	   international	  
organization,	  seems	  even	  more	  intelligible	  and	  multifaceted.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  a	  common	  or	  
shared	   identity	   of	   the	   constitutive	   parts	   of	   a	   community	   that	   serves	   as	   a	   foundation	   for	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  collective	  identity	  of	  the	  political	  community	  as	  such	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  There	  are	  
several	  ways	  to	  categorize	  the	  different	  understandings	  of	  identity,	  like	  the	  differentiation	  between	  
an	   objectivist	   and	   a	   subjectivist	   understanding;9 	  Martí	   for	   instance	   differentiates	   between	   the	  
identity	   of	   the	   constitution	   and	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   people	   by	   at	   the	   same	   time	   admitting	   that	   in	  
modern	   constitutional	   democracies	   there	   is	   no	   easy	   demarcation	   possible.10	  Dänzer	   identifies	   four	  
meanings	   of	   the	   notion:	   (i)	   identity	   of	   a	   community	   in	   its	   self-­‐understanding,	   (ii)	   a	   collective	   or	  
individual	   identity	   as	   objectively	   including	   the	   traits	   of	   an	   identity	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   its	   self-­‐
understanding,	   (iii)	   identity	   as	   the	   identification	  of	   citizens	  with	   a	   political	   community	   and	   (iv)	   the	  
identity	  of	  a	  community	  as	  perceived	  from	  outside.11	  What	  obviously	  underlies	  all	  understandings	  of	  
that	   notion	   is	   that	   it	   refers	   to	   the	   choices	  made	   by	   a	   people,	   by	   a	   constituency	   that	   has	   thereby	  
agreed	  on	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  living	  together.	  The	  values	  expressed	  by	  those	  choices	  are	  shared	  by	  the	  
citizens	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence,	   imprinting	   the	   collective	   identity.	   Values	   are	   not	   easily	   capable	   of	  
fitting	   into	   legal	   categories	   however;	   they	   are	   too	   difficult	   to	   capture	   and	   to	   define.12	  The	   link	  
between	   common/shared	   and	   collective	   identities,	   which	   underlies	   the	   present	   analysis,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Based	  on	  a	  questionnaire	  and	  the	  replies	  of	  50	  randomly	  selected	  participants.	  
9	  Von	   Bogdandy/Schill,	   Overcoming	   absolute	   Primacy:	   Respect	   for	   national	   Identity	   under	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty,	  
CMLRev	  2011,	  1417	  (1428	  et	  seq).	  
10 	  Martí,	   Two	   different	   ideas	   of	   Constitutional	   Identity,	   in	   Saiz	   Arnaiz/Alcoberro	   Llivina	   (eds),	   National	  
Constitutional	  Identity	  and	  European	  Integration,	  2013,	  17	  (19	  et	  seq).	  
11	  Dänzer,	   Values	   and	   identity	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   in	   Besson/Cheneval/Levrat	   (eds),	   Des	   valeurs	   pour	  
l’Europe?	  Values	  for	  Europe?	  2008,	  53	  (54).	  
12	  For	  a	  definition	  of	   the	  notion	  values	   cf	  Calliess,	  Europe	  as	  Transnational	   Law	  –	  The	  Transnationalization	  of	  
Values	  by	  European	  Law,	  German	  Law	  Journal,	  1367	  et	  seq.	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presupposes	  that	  the	  common	  identity	  of	  the	  people	   is	   inherent	   in	  the	   identity	  of	  the	  constitution,	  
which	  reflects	  the	  collective	  identity	  of	  a	  community.	  
	  
Of	   course,	   national	   identity	   does	   not	   necessarily	   equate	   State	   identity,	   as	   there	  might	   be	   several	  
different	  nations	  and	  thus	  different	  national	  identities	  coexisting	  within	  one	  State.	  The	  identity	  of	  the	  
State	   as	   such	   is	   built	   upon	   the	   shared	   identity	   of	   its	   people	   and	   thus	   shaped	   by	   factors	   such	   as	  
culture,	  history	  and	  religion,	  evolving	  from	  the	  togetherness	  of	  a	  collectivity	  of	  individuals	  over	  time.	  
There	  are	  also	  cases	  however,	  where	  a	  collective	   identity	   is	  created	  artificially;	  due	  to	  the	   lack	  of	  a	  
foundational	  common	  identity,	  the	  collective	  identity	  is	  imposed	  on	  the	  people	  and	  will	  in	  most	  cases	  
not	  be	  a	  strong	  one.	  
	  
II.2.	  Identity	  and	  democracy	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  context	  
	  
The	  present	  paper	  suggests	  that	  constitutional	  identity	  is	  essential	  for	  a	  working	  national	  democracy	  
as	  well	  as	  for	  a	  transnational	  democratic	  system;	  it	  is	  therefore	  one	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  more	  
specifically	  of	  process	  legitimacy.13	  In	  a	  democracy,	  the	  values	  of	  a	  specific	  population	  do	  imprint	  the	  
work	   of	   the	   legislative	   branch	   that	   has	   to	   translate	   those	   very	   values	   into	   law.	   Therefore,	   the	  
individual	  has	   to	  be	  understood	  as	   the	  smallest	  and	  most	  essential	  unit	   imprinting	   that	   identity	  by	  
means	  of	   his/her	  participation	   in	   the	  democratic	   process.14	  The	   individuals	   as	   the	  bearer	  of	   values	  
stand	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   political	   community	   as	   the	   creator	   of	   norms	   and	   the	   agent	   who	   acts	   for	   the	  
political	  community	  as	  a	  sovereign	  on	  the	  international	  plane.15	  Hence,	   law	  serves	  as	  an	  expression	  
of	   values	   and	   thus	  of	  national	   identity,	   the	   latter	  being	  prerequisite	   for	   the	  democratic	  process;	   if	  
there	   is	   no	   sense	   of	   identification	   of	   individuals	   with	   a	   community,	   there	   will	   be	   no	   political	  
participation	  and	  thus	  a	  deficit	  in	  process	  legitimacy.	  
	  
It	   follows	   for	   the	   EU	   context,	   that	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  Member	   States,	   the	   endeavor	   to	  
safeguard	   their	   individual	   identities	   can	  be	   seen	  as	  an	  effort	   to	  compensate	   for	   the	   seemingly	   lost	  
struggle	  to	  preserve	  sovereignty,	  resulting	  –	  among	  others	  –	  from	  the	  absolute	  primacy	  doctrine	  of	  
the	  CJEU;16	  furthermore,	  the	  respect	  for	  national	  identity	  claimed	  for	  by	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  should	  be	  seen	  
as	  a	  possible	  way	  to	  preserve	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  the	  
Union.17	  The	  then	  European	  Community	  (EC)	  for	  a	  long	  time	  derived	  its	  legitimacy	  from	  delivering	  the	  
results;	  after	  having	  (at	  least	  in	  part)	  successfully	  delivered	  these	  results,	  the	  focus	  has	  substantially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Weiler,	  Editorial	  –	  Fateful	  Elections?	  Investing	  in	  the	  Future	  Fear,	  EJIL	  25/2014,	  361.	  
14	  In	   this	   context	   see	  Besson/Utzinger,	   Toward	   European	   Citizenship,	   Journal	   of	   Social	   Philosophy	   2008,	   185	  
(188),	  according	  to	  whom	  a	  stable	  collective	  identity	  partly	  results	  from	  citizenship.	  
15	  On	  the	  distinction	  between	  values	  and	  norms	  Dänzer	  (supra	  note	  11)	  59	  et	  seq,	  who	  refers	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  
Habermas	  and	  Ferry.	  
16	  According	  to	  Toniatti	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  when	  acceding	  the	  EU,	  is	  “partially	  transformed	  
into	  a	  power	  (indeed,	  a	  right)	  of	  participation”,	  Toniatti,	  Sovereignty	  Lost,	  Constitutional	  Identity	  Regained,	  in	  
Saiz	  Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  Llivina	  (supra	  note	  10)	  49	  (55	  et	  seq).	  
17	  According	   to	   López	   Bofill,	   „any	   loss	   of	   the	  Member	   States´	   constitutional	   power	   is	   conceived	   as	   a	   loss	   of	  
democratic	   legitimacy“,	   López	   Bofill,	  What	   is	   not	   Constitutional	   Pluralism	   in	   the	   EU:	   National	   Constitutional	  
Identity	   in	   the	   German	   Lisbon	   Judgment,	   in	   Saiz	   Arnaiz/Alcoberro	   Llivina	   (supra	   note	   10)	   221	   (222).	  Besson	  
states	  that,	  when	  a	  State	  is	  bound	  by	  a	  norm	  of	  international	  law,	  the	  duties	  imposed	  on	  that	  State	  constitute	  
direct	  or	   indirect	  burdens	   for	   individuals;	   therefore,	   the	  “autonomy	  of	   (S)tates	  and	   its	  ability	   to	  bind	  and	  be	  
bound	   depends	   on	   its	   constituency’s	   autonomy	   and	   hence	   on	   its	   ability	   to	   represent	   the	   latter”;	  Besson	   in	  
response	  to	  Waldron	  (Waldron,	  Are	  Sovereigns	  Entitled	  to	  the	  Benefit	  of	  the	  International	  Rule	  of	  Law?	  Public	  
Law	   &	   Legal	   Theory	   Research	   Paper	   Series	   WP	   No	   09-­‐01),	   Besson,	   Sovereignty,	   International	   Law	   and	  
Democracy,	  EJIIL	  2011,	  373	  (378).	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shifted	  from	  output	  to	  process	  legitimacy.	  This	  shift	  corresponds	  to	  the	  progressive	  jurisprudence	  of	  
the	  CJEU,	  who,	  from	  the	  1960s	  onwards	  continuously	  strived	  to	  place	  the	  individual	  –	  alongside	  the	  
Member	  States	  –	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  project.	  It	  was	  also	  the	  CJEU	  that	  consistently	  held	  that	  European	  
citizenship	  is	  destined	  to	  be	  the	  fundamental	  status	  of	  the	  nationals	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  a	  status	  
that	  as	  such	  gives	  specific	   rights	   to	   the	  people.18	  Since	   then	  the	   individual	  has	  been	  perceived	  as	  a	  
subject	  of	  rights	  (and	  duties),	  whose	  participation	  has	  to	  be	  ensured.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  there	  was	  an	  
increasing	  effort	  to	  establish	  participative	  and	  direct	  democratic	  elements	  on	  the	  EU	  level,	  expecting	  
that	  European	  citizens	  would	  understand	  themselves	  as	  a	  European	  people,	  a	  European	  demos.	  
	  
Therefore,	  direct	  elections	   to	   the	  European	  Parliament19	  were	   introduced	   in	  1979,	   followed	  by	   the	  
incorporation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  European	  citizenship	  into	  the	  Treaties	  in	  1992.	  As	  the	  past	  has	  shown	  
however,	   citizens	  are	  not	  willing	   to	  actually	  participate	  and	   thus	  contribute	   to	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
European	   political	   space.	   This	   becomes	   evident	   not	   least	   by	   the	   steadily	   decreasing	   turnout	   in	  
elections	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  success	  of	  Eurosceptic	  parties	  in	  several	  States.	  At	  least	  
some	  sort	  of	  collective	  identity	  of	  a	  people	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  real	  citizenship	  and	  
thus	   indispensable	   for	   a	   working	   democracy.	   This	   is	   not	   only	   valid	   in	   the	   State	   context	   but	   holds	  
likewise	  –	  and	   is	   crucially	   true	  –	   for	   the	  European	  Union.20	  The	  malfunctioning	  democratic	  process	  
results	   in	   a	   lack	   of	   process	   legitimacy	   that	   has	   to	   be	   compensated	   by	   drawing	   on	   the	   legitimacy	  
resources	  of	   the	  Member	  States.	  After	  having	  established	  a	   link	  between	  demoratic	  processes	  and	  
identity,	  the	  subsequent	  section	  is	  devoted	  to	  hierarchical	  aspects	  of	  identity.	  
	  
II.3.	  Identity	  and	  hierarchy	  
	  
Democratically	  legitimized	  by	  the	  people,	  the	  pouvoir	  constituant,	  national	  constitutions	  reveal	  what	  
is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  Member	  State’s	  identity.	  Undermining	  this	  very	  identity	  would	  in	  turn	  weaken	  the	  
legitimacy	   of	   the	   Union,	   which	   is	   reliant	   on	   the	  Member	   States	   and	   their	   capability	   to	   take	   even	  
unpopular	  measures	  without	  their	  existence	  hardly	  ever	  being	  called	  into	  question.21	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  
fact,	  not	  all	  elements	  constitutive	  for	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  specific	  entity,	  be	  it	  an	  individual,	  a	  State	  or	  an	  
international	   organization,	   are	   of	   the	   same	   importance.	   There	   are	   specific	   criteria	   that	   form	   a	  
fundamental	  part	  of	  an	  identity,	  the	  preferences	  that	  cannot	  be	  replaced	  easily	  without	  making	  the	  
entity	   as	   a	  whole	   exchangeable	  with	   any	  other	   of	   its	   kind.	  Hence,	   there	   is	   a	   hierarchical	   structure	  
inherent	   in	   identity.	   This	   is	   true	   for	   the	   individual;	   traumatic	   experiences	   during	   childhood	   will	  
lastingly	  coin	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  person.	  This	  is	  likewise	  true	  for	  States;	  one	  may	  look	  for	  example	  at	  the	  
significance	  of	  WWII	  on	  today´s	  Germany,	  that	  has	   immensely	  shaped	  its	  culture,	   its	  understanding	  
of	   the	   self	   and	   the	   other,	   that	   has	   lastingly	   coined	   its	   values	   and	   that	   is	   inseparably	   linked	   to	   the	  
identity	  of	  that	  State.	  There	  are	  other	  criteria	  however,	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  respective	  identity,	  but	  
that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  do	  not	  constitute	  an	  indispensable	  part	  of	  it	  and	  that	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  changes	  
over	  time.	  This	  is	  again	  true	  for	  the	  individual,	  if	  one	  thinks	  of	  the	  external	  appearance	  of	  a	  person,	  
which	   is	   part	   of	   the	   identity	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   subject	   to	   fundamental	   changes.	   Even	   though	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  See	  eg	  Case	  C-­‐135/08,	  Janko	  Rottmann,	  ECR	  2010,	  I-­‐1449,	  para	  43	  with	  further	  references.	  
19	  Act	  concerning	   the	  election	  of	   the	   representatives	  of	   the	  European	  Parliament	  by	  direct	  universal	   suffrage	  
annexed	   to	   Decision	   76/787/ECSC,	   EEC,	   Euratom,	   OJ	   1976	   L	   278/1,	   as	   amended	   by	   Decision	   2002/772/EC,	  
Euratom,	  OJ	  2001	  L	  283/1.	  
20	  See	  Besson,	  Europe	  as	  a	  demoi-­‐cratic	  polity,	  Retfaerd	  –	  Nordisk	  Juridisk	  Tidsskrift	  2007,	  3.	  
21	  Weiler	  (supra	  note	  4);	  In	  this	  context	  Petit,	  Dispelling	  a	  Myth?	  The	  Fathers	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  
a	  Euro-­‐Identity,	  ELJ	  2006,	  661.	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collective	  identities	  are	  less	  dynamic	  than	  that	  of	   individuals,	  there	  are	  parts	  of	  their	   identities	  that	  
can	  be	  regarded	  less	  fundamental,	  too.	  Here	  currency	  may	  be	  mentioned;	  even	  though	  the	  Schilling	  
was	  obviously	  part	  of	   the	  Austrian	   identity,	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  Euro	   revealed	   that	   it	   is	   not	   an	  
indispensable	  part	  of	  it.	  While	  for	  one	  State	  secularism	  may	  serve	  as	  fundamental	  part	  of	  its	  identity,	  
for	  another	  State	  –	  even	   if	   it	   is	   likewise	  a	   secular	  State	  –	   it	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	   less	   identity-­‐forming	  
hallmark.	  This	  shows	  that	  the	  actual	  importance	  of	  a	  specific	  element	  constitutive	  for	  identity	  has	  to	  
be	  assessed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  	  
	  
Thus,	   the	   deeply	   heterogeneous	   and	   broad	   understanding	   of	   what	   has	   to	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	  
identity	  of	  a	  specific	  entity	  and	  what	  is	  essential	  for	  it	  is	  left	  to	  subjective	  assessment.	  If	  identity	  is	  to	  
become	  a	  legal	  concept	  however,	  this	  inconceivability	  can	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  highly	  problematic.	  This	  is	  
revealed	  by	  the	  identity	  clause	  in	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  that	  has	  been	  incorporated	  into	  primary	  EU	  law	  more	  
than	  ten	  years	  ago;22	  since	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon23	  has	  subjected	  it	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  CJEU,	  the	  
provision	  has	  dramatically	  gained	  in	  importance	  however.	  
	  
II.4.	  Identity	  and	  constitutional	  law	  
	  
Since	  the	  BVerfG	  first	  referred	  to	  national	  identity	  in	  the	  context	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  in	  Solange	  I,24	  
the	  legal	  understanding	  of	  identity	  has	  been	  steadily	  narrowed	  down	  to	  a	  constitutional	  dimension.	  
Having	  identified	  the	  hierarchical	  aspects	  of	  identity	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  what	  is	  analysed	  in	  the	  
present	  chapter,	  is	  its	  constitutional	  dimension.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  assessed	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  can	  
speak	  of	  “constitutional	  identity”	  also	  within	  the	  EU	  context.	  
	  
In	  a	  frist	  step	  the	  functions	  of	  constititutional	  law	  in	  a	  national	  as	  well	  as	  in	  an	  international	  context	  
are	   analyzed.	   Coexistence	   and	   cooperation	   of	   one	   or	   more	   peoples	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   a	  
political	  community	  require	  a	  set	  of	  commonly	  agreed	  foundational	  rules,	  whatever	  they	  are	  called.	  
As	  a	  consequence,	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  legal	  hierarchy	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  impose	  certain	  constraints	  
on	  the	  legislative	  branch,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  ensure	  stability,	  flexibility	  and	  efficiency	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  
is	  true	  for	  the	  national	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  transnational	  level.	  In	  the	  national	  context,	  the	  constitution	  
as	  a	   foundational	  document	  expressing	   the	  basic	  choices	  of	  a	  constituency	  has	   to	  guarantee	   these	  
choices	   in	   a	   stable	   and	   consistent	   way	   and	   thus	   to	   safeguard	   them	   from	   politics.25	  Constitutional	  
language	  is	   increasingly	  used	  also	  within	  the	  context	  of	   international	   law,	  where	  constitutionality	   is	  
typically	   ascribed	   to	   hierarchical	   superior	   ius	   cogens	   or	   the	   Charter	   of	   the	  United	  Nations.26	  Apart	  
from	   that	   it	   is	   the	   founding	   treaties	   of	   international	   organizations	   that	   typically	   assume	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Consolidated	  version	  in	  OJ	  1992	  C	  224.	  
23	  OJ	  2007	  C	  306.	  
24	  BVerfG	  37,	  271,	  29.5.1974,	  Solange	  I.	  
25 See	   the	   debate	   between	   Matthias	   Kumm	   and	   Nico	   Krisch	   on	   EJIL	   talk,	   at	  
http://www.ejiltalk.org/cosmopolitan-­‐constitutionalism-­‐a-­‐response-­‐to-­‐nico-­‐krisch/	   and	  
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-­‐dream-­‐of-­‐reason-­‐a-­‐response-­‐to-­‐mattias-­‐kumm/.	  
26	  Art	  103	  UNC	  (1	  UNTS	  XVI);	  see	  for	  instance	  Schwarzenberger,	  International	  Jus	  Cogens?	  43	  Texas	  Law	  Review	  
1964/1965,	   455;	  Kumm	   refers	   to	  domestic	   constitutionalism	  as	   “big	  C”	   constitutionalism	  and	  with	   regard	   to	  
international	   law	  as	   “small	   c”	   constitutionalism;	  Kumm,	   The	  Cosmopolitan	  Turn	   in	  Constitutionalism:	  On	   the	  
Relationship	  between	  Constitutionalism	  in	  and	  beyond	  the	  State,	  in	  Dunoff/Trachtman	  (eds),	  Ruling	  the	  World?	  
Constitutionalism,	  International	  Law,	  and	  Global	  Governance,	  2009,	  258	  (259	  et	  seq).	  
Weiler,	  Prologue:	  global	  and	  pluralist	  constitutionalism	  –	  some	  doubts,	  in	  Weiler/De	  Búrca	  (eds),	  The	  Worlds	  of	  
European	  Constitutionalism,	  2012,	  8	  (10);	  Halberstam,	  Local,	  global	  and	  plural	  constitutionalism:	  Europe	  meets	  
the	  world,	  in	  Weiler/De	  Búrca	  (supra)	  150	  (159).	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“constitutional”	  function,	  what	  Peters	  defines	  as	  micro-­‐constitutionalization27.	  Even	  though	  there	  are	  
fundamental	  differences	  regarding	  the	  concept	  of	  constitutionalism	  in	  the	  national	  and	  international	  
sphere	   in	   terms	   of	   content,	   consistency,	   responsibility,	   pluralism,	   hierarchy	   and	   the	   pouvoir	  
constituant,	  the	  notion	  is	  increasingly	  used	  in	  international	  legal	  theory.	  While	  not	  formally	  referred	  
to	  as	  a	  constitution	  like	  it	  is	  mostly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  State	  context,	  it	  is	  indeed	  comparable	  in	  various	  
aspects	  –	  procedurally	  and	  substantively.	  One	  may	  just	  think	  of	  the	  qualified	  procedures	  set	  in	  place	  
for	   the	   amendment	   of	   such	   statutes	   that	   regularly	   require	   unanimity	   and	   the	   ratification	   by	   all	  
participating	   States.	   Given	   the	   content	   of	   statutes	   that	   typically	   include	   foundational	   principles,	  
provisions	  regarding	  the	  confinement	  of	  public	  power	  and	  attribution	  of	  competences,28	  there	  is	  also	  
comparability	  in	  substantive	  terms.	  As	  recourse	  to	  constitutionalism	  seems	  basically	  acceptable,	  the	  
European	  Union	  legal	  system	  is	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  constitutional	  system.	  
	  
The	  fundamental	  values	  of	  a	  polity	  are	  typically	  encapsulated	  within	  a	  constitution,	  that	  reflects	  the	  
collective	   identity,	   which	   is	   further	   framed	   as	   a	   Nation,	   a	   State	   or	   a	   Union.	   Thus	   constitutions	  
typically	  define	  collective	  identities	  of	  a	  people	  in	  a	  way	  that	  ensures	  reliability,	  stability,	  protection	  
and	  togetherness.29	  Not	  only	  do	  constitutions	  determine	  the	  rules	  for	  democratic	  processes,	  but	  they	  
also	  serve	  as	  an	  indispensable	  basis	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  effective	  and	  real	  citizenship	  by	  defining	  
the	   collective	   identity	   of	   a	   people.30	  	   This	   means,	   in	   turn,	   that	   democracy	   needs	   some	   sort	   of	  
constitutional	   identity.	   Furthermore,	   a	   collective	   identity	   is	   required	   to	   achieve	   several	   other	  
objectives	  like	  the	  reduction	  of	  social	  conflicts,	  solidarity,	  trust,	  redistribution	  and	  the	  willingness	  to	  
cooperate.31	  Conversely,	   it	   is	  argued	  that	  national	   identity	  is	   likely	  to	  be	  reinforced	  by	  governments	  
as	   an	   artificial	   construct	   instrumental	   for	   the	   abovementioned	   reasons.	   From	   a	   universalist	  
perspective,	   this	   is	   problematic	   for	   minorities	   and	   cosmopolitans	   and	   bars	   the	   way	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  global	  consciousness.32	  
	  
II.5.	  Constitutional	  (identity)	  conflicts	  in	  the	  national	  and	  the	  EU	  context	  
	  
In	   federal	   systems33	  there	   is	   often	  more	   than	   just	   one	   source	   of	   constitutional	   law	   and	   therefore	  
several	   constitutional	   identities	   in	   place.	  While	   in	   the	   State	   context,	   there	   is	   typically	   the	   federal	  
constitution	  and	  those	  of	  the	  constituent	  States,	  the	  EU	  legal	  system	  comprises	  a	  greater	  plurality	  of	  
constitutional	  norms:	   fundamental	   (constitutional)	  norms	  of	  EU	   law	  coexist	  with	   the	   constitutional	  
law	   of	   28	   (in	   part	   again	   federally	   organized)	  Member	   States.	   Furthermore	   there	   are	   fundamental	  
rules	  of	   international	   law	  that	  have	  an	   increasing	   impact	  on	  the	  national	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  EU	  legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Peters	  (supra	  note	  57)	  593	  et	  seq;	  also	  Kumm	  (supra	  note	  26)	  259.	  
28	  According	  to	  Besson,	   the	  “main	  and	  common	  claim”	  of	  constitutionalism,	  even	  though	  it	  can	  take	  different	  
forms,	  “is	  that	  political	  and	  legal	  power	  should	  be	  exercised	  only	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  constitution,	  such	  as	  the	  
separation	  of	  powers,	  checks	  and	  balances,	   the	  rule	  of	   law,	  democracy	  and	   fundamental	   rights“	  Besson,	  The	  
Truth	  about	  Legal	  Pluralism,	  EuConst	  2012,	  354	  (358).	  
29	  Cf	  Weiler,	  Federalism	  and	  Constitutionalism:	  Europe’s	  Sonderweg,	  JMWP	  10/00;	  also	  Weiler,	  Ein	  christliches	  
Europa.	  Erkundungsgänge,	  2004,	  38	  et	  seq.	  
30	  This	   corresponds	   to	   some	   authors´	   understanding	   of	   the	   new	   identity	   clause	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   national	  
constitutions	   are	   shaping	   and	   constituting	   national	   identity;	   Von	   Bogdandy/Schill,	   Art	   4	   Abs	   2	   EUV	   in	  
Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim	  (eds),	  Das	  Recht	  der	  Europäischen	  Union,	  50.	  EL,	  para	  3.	  
31	  Miller/Ali,	  Testing	  the	  national	  identity	  argument,	  European	  Political	  Science	  Review	  2014,	  237	  (237	  et	  seq).	  
32	  Miller/Ali	  (supra	  note	  31)	  234	  et	  seq.	  
33	  Cf	  Halberstam´s	   definition	   of	   a	   federal	   system	   as	   „the	   coexistence	   within	   a	   compound	   polity	   of	   multiple	  
levels	  of	  government	  each	  with	  constitutionally	  grounded	  claims	  to	  some	  degree	  of	  organizational	  autonomy	  
and	  jurisdictional	  authority“,	  Halberstam,	  Federalism:	  Theory,	  Policy,	  Law,	  2012,	  580.	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orders.34	  In	  both	  contexts,	  national	  and	  EU,	  constitutional	  norms	  flowing	  from	  different	  sources	  are	  
typically	  complementing	  one	  another	  and	  thus	  incongruent	  in	  substance;	  this	  is	  confirmed	  inter	  alia	  
by	  the	  principle	  of	  conferral	  laid	  down	  in	  Art	  5(2)	  TEU,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  Union	  acts	  only	  within	  
the	   limits	   of	   the	   competences	   conferred	   upon	   it	   by	   the	   Member	   States.	   Even	   if	   this	   principal	  
difference	  in	  substance	  may	  limit	  potential	  incompatibilities,	  it	  does	  not	  exclude	  them	  however.	  
	  
Federal	  systems	  usually	  provide	  for	  some	  sort	  of	  predetermined	  hierarchy	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  
among	  constitutional	  norms.	  This	  does	  not	  hold	  for	  the	  Union	  however,	  where	  the	  legal	  hierarchy	  is	  
far	   less	   clear	   than	   in	   most	   federal	   States.	   Constitutional	   conflicts	   arising	   within	   (multilevel)	  
constitutional	  systems	  are	  typically	  subject	  to	  judicial	  review.	  While	  this	  task	  usually	  falls	  within	  the	  
competence	  of	  the	  federal	  constitutional	  court	  in	  the	  national	  context,	  it	  is	  the	  CJEU	  who	  decides	  on	  
the	  EU	  level.	  In	  absence	  of	  a	  Treaty	  provision	  explicitly	  determining	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  constitutional	  
norms	  at	   issue,	   the	  European	  Court	  of	   Justice	   (ECJ)	  has	  acknowledged	  direct	  effect	  and	  primacy	  of	  
then	  EC	   law.	  Since	  then,	   in	  principle	  any	  constitutional	  conflict	  among	  EU	   law	  and	  domestic	   law	  of	  
the	  Member	  States	  has	  to	  be	  resolved	  by	  means	  of	  these	  doctrines.35	  Even	  though	  the	  CJEU’s	  rulings	  
are	   consistently	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	   absolute	   primacy	   of	   EU	   law,	   the	   Member	   States’	  
constitutional	  courts	  consistently	  strive	  to	  protect	  their	  constitutional	  core.	  
	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  resolution	  of	  conflicts	  between	  different	  sources	  of	  constitutional	  law	  is	  less	  
problematic	  with	   regard	   to	   constitutional	   provisions	   that	   are	   relatively	   precise	   and	   predominantly	  
technical	   in	   character.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	  more	   indefinite	  and	  politically	   sensitive	   issues	  however	  –	  
especially	   where	   constitutional	   norms	   at	   stake	   express	   constitutional	   identity	   –	   there	   are	   several	  
factors	  that	  make	  conflict	  resolution	  more	  complex	  on	  the	  EU	  than	  on	  the	  national	  level.	  First,	  there	  
will	  hardly	  be	  as	  severe	  differences	  in	  the	  constitutional	  identities	  within	  the	  legal	  system	  of	  a	  single	  
State	   than	   on	   the	   transnational	   European	   Union	   level	   where	   28	   different	   constitutional	   identities	  
coexist	  with	  the	  constitutional	  identity	  of	  the	  Union.	  Second,	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  democratic	  
legitimacy	  of	  national	  constitutions	  and	  the	  fundamental	  norms	  of	  the	  EU	  law.	  While	  the	  former	  –	  on	  
the	  federal	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  State	  level	  –	  typically	  derive	  their	  legitimacy	  from	  “we	  the	  people”	  as	  a	  
constituency,	  the	  foundational	  Treaties	  of	  the	  Union	  do	  not	  enjoy	  a	  comparable	  degree	  of	  legitimacy.	  
Here	   the	   will	   of	   the	   people	   is	   first	   and	   foremost	   represented	   by	   the	   Member	   States;	   as	   a	  
consequence,	   primacy	   of	   EU	   law	   over	   national	   law	   „however	   framed“36	  seems	   more	   problematic	  
than	   in	   the	   national	   context,	   when	   eg	   federal	   constitutions	   pre-­‐empt	   constitutions	   of	   constituent	  
States.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  the	  question	  of	  judicial	  competence.	  It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  it	  was	  the	  CJEU	  who	  
has	   developed	   the	   absolute	   primacy	   doctrine	   and	   thus	   subordinated	   national	   (constitutional	   and	  
therefore	  also	  identity	  related)	  in	  relation	  to	  EU	  law.	  Therefore	  it	  comes	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  latter	  
Court	   is	   perceived	   as	   the	   „engine	   of	   European	   integration“	   and	   thus	   as	   being	   mostly	   in	   favor	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  See	  Case	  T-­‐315/01,	  Kadi	  v	  Council	  and	  Commission,	  ECR	  2005,	  II-­‐3649;	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐402/05	  P	  and	  C-­‐415/05	  
P,	  Yassin	  Abdullah	  Kadi	  and	  Al	  Barakaat	  International	  Foundation	  v	  Council	  and	  Commission,	  ECR	  2008,	  I-­‐6351.	  
According	   to	   Besson	   the	   „three	   autonomous	   layers	   of	   the	   European	   legal	   order	   lato	   sensu	   ought	   to	   be	  
considered	   at	   the	   same	   time	  when	   assessing	   the	   articulation	   between	   any	   two	  of	   them“;	  Besson,	   European	  
Legal	  Pluralism	  after	  Kadi,	  EuConst	  2009,	  237	  (239).	  
35	  Case	   26-­‐62,	   NV	   Algemene	   Transport-­‐	   en	   Expeditie	   Onderneming	   van	   Gend	   &	   Loos	   v	   Netherlands	   Inland	  
Revenue	   Administration,	   ECR	   1963,	   1,	   2.	   See	   De	   Witte,	   The	   European	   Union	   as	   an	   international	   legal	  
experiment,	  in	  Weiler/De	  Búrca	  (supra	  note	  26)	  19	  (42	  et	  seq).	  
36	  Case	  11/70,	   Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft,	   ECR	  1970,	  112,	  para	  3,	  where	   the	  CJEU	  held	   that	   “the	   law	  
stemming	  from	  the	  Treaty,	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  law,	  cannot	  because	  of	  its	  very	  nature	  be	  overridden	  by	  
rules	  of	  national	  law,	  however	  framed,	  without	  being	  deprived	  of	  its	  character	  as	  Community	  law	  and	  without	  
the	  legal	  basis	  of	  the	  Community	  itself	  being	  called	  in	  question”.	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deepening	   European	   integration	   rather	   than	   an	   independent	   judicial	   institution.	   National	  
constitutional	   courts	   on	   the	   contrary,	   above	   all	   the	   German	   BVerfG,	   are	   consistently	   striving	   to	  
protect	   national	   sovereignty	   and	   identity,37	  even	   though	   to	   date	   they	   have	   widely	   accepted	   the	  
supremacy	  of	  EU	  law.	  This	  acceptance	  is	  supposed	  to	  endure	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Union	  respects	  the	  limits	  
to	  primacy	  that	  were	  famously	  imposed	  by	  the	  BVerfG,	  namely	  the	  fundamental	  rights-­‐reservation	  in	  
Solange,	   the	   ultra-­‐vires-­‐reservation	   introduced	   in	   Maastricht	   and	   finally	   the	   identity	   review	  
introduced	   in	   Lisbon.38	  The	   conflicting	   interests	   of	   national	   constitutional	   courts	   obviously	  weaken	  
the	  authority	  of	  the	  CJEU	  and	  therefore	  constitute	  a	  risk	  for	  the	  uniform	  application	  of	  EU	  law.39	  So	  
what	   about	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   in	   this	   context?	   Certainly,	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   fundamental	   rights-­‐
reservation	  and	  the	  ultra-­‐vires	  reservation,	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  the	  identity-­‐reservation	  seems	  
a	   lot	   more	   comprehensive;	   it	   is	   at	   least	   capable	   of	   covering	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   competence	  
related	   issues	   alike.	   The	   objective	   of	   preserving	   national	   identity	   is	   a	  much	  more	   heterogenic	   and	  
indeterminate	  issue	  that	  poses	  fundamental	  questions	  concerning	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  
as	  such	  within	  a	  united	  Europe.	  The	  question	  to	  be	  answered	  is	  if	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  should	  be	  understood	  
ie	  as	  neutralizing	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  cases	  where	  EU	  law	  stands	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  national	  constitutional	  
identity	  of	  a	  State	  or	  if	  it	  simply	  lowers	  the	  degree	  of	  normativity	  of	  EU	  law	  in	  such	  cases.	  For	  being	  
able	  to	  answer	  these	  questions,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  first	  establish	  what	  should	  be	  covered	  by	  national	  
constitutional	  identity	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU.	  
	  
II.6.	  Identity	  and	  constitutional	  theory	  
	  
Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  obviously	  demands	  a	  discussion	  about	  how	  the	  different	  constitutional	  systems	   in	  the	  
EU	  should	  be	  related	  to	  and	  demarcated	  against	  one	  another.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  determination	  
what	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  national	  constitutional	   identities	   that	   is	   relevant	   in	   this	  context,	  but	  
also	  their	  coexistence	  and	  preservation	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  Union;	  in	  sum,	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  
questions	  the	  Union´s	  constitutional	  arrangement.	  	  
	  
First,	   it	   is	   decisive	   to	   differentiate	   two	   different	   links	   between	   individuals	   and	   their	   respective	  
political	  communities;	  there	  is	  the	  predominantly	  ethnic	  and	  cultural	  way	  of	  identification	  on	  the	  one	  
hand	  and	  the	  predominantly	  civic	  (or	  political)	  identification	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  The	  former	  refers	  to	  
a	   cultural	   bond,	   a	   common	   language,	   race,	   religion,	   social	   mores,	   a	   common	   history,	   common	  
traditions	   and	   common	   descent.	   It	   is	   the	   civic	   understanding	   in	   contrast	   that	   is	   linked	   to	   the	  
constitution	  itself,	  to	  the	  respect	  for	  the	  State	  and	  its	  institutions.40	  The	  latter	  is	  –	  so	  to	  say	  –	  a	  less	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  For	   instance	   BVerfG	   37,	   271,	   29.5.1974,	   Solange	   I;	   BVerfG	   1993,	   89,	   155,	   12.10.1993,	  Maastricht;	   Corte	  
Costituzionale,	  Sent	  183/73,	  18.12.1973,	  Frontini	  Franco;	  Conseil	  Constitutionnel,	  92-­‐308	  DC,	  9.4.1992,	  Traité	  
sur	  l’Union	  européenne/Maastricht;	  Danish	  Hojesteret,	  I	  361/1997,	  6.4.1998,	  Maastricht.	  
38	  Cf	  supra	  note	  37.	  Guastaferro,	  Beyond	  the	  Exceptionalism	  of	  Constitutional	  Conflicts:	  The	  Ordinary	  Functions	  
of	   the	   Identity	  Clause,	   JMWP	  01/2012,	  10;	  Halberstam/Möllers,	  The	  German	  Constitutional	  Court	  says	  „Ja	  Zu	  
Deutschland!“,	   German	   Law	   Journal	   2009,	   1241;	   Thym,	   In	   the	   Name	   of	   Sovereign	   Statehood:	   A	   critical	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  Lisbon	  Judgment	  of	  the	  German	  Constitutional	  Court,	  CMLRev	  2009,	  1795;	  Tomuschat,	  The	  
Defence	  of	  National	   Identity	  by	  the	  German	  Constitutional	  Court,	   in	  Saiz	  Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  Llivina	  (supra	  note	  
10)	  205.	  On	  the	  “adoption”	  of	  the	  “German	  model”	  by	  other	  constitutional	  courts,	  cf	  Rideau,	  The	  Case-­‐law	  of	  
the	  Polish,	  Hungarian	   and	  Czech	  Constitutional	   Courts	   on	  National	   Identity	   and	   the	   `German	  Model’,	   in	   Saiz	  
Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  Llivina	  (supra	  note	  10)	  243	  (250	  et	  seq).	  
39	  On	  „relative	  supremacy“	  see	  Schütze,	  European	  Constitutional	  Law,	  2012,	  358	  et	  seq.	  
40	  Gamberale,	  National	  Identities	  and	  Citizenship	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  European	  Public	  Law	  1995,	  633	  (639	  
et	   seq);	  Miller/Ali	   (supra	  note	  31)	  247;	  Peters,	  A	  new	   look	  at	   ‘National	   Identity’.	  How	  should	  we	   think	  about	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emotional	   and	   more	   rational	   and	   pragmatic	   conception,	   which	   is	   much	   more	   inclusive	   than	   the	  
ethnic	  model	   that	   is	  more	   restrictive	   and	   exclusionist.41	  As	   examples,	   it	   is	   typically	   referred	   to	   the	  
German	  Volk	  as	  a	  community	  of	  blood	  and	  territory	  and	  therefore	  predominantly	  ethnic	   in	  nature,	  
while	  the	  French	  nation	  serves	  as	  an	  example	  for	  a	  predominantly	  civic	  understanding	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  
adherence	   to	   a	   political	   community.42	  At	   this	   point	   the	   question	   arises,	   how	   the	   EU	   constitutional	  
arrangement	   as	   a	   whole	   should	   be	   designed	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   preservation	   of	   so	   many	   different	  
constitutional	  identities.	  
	  
The	   concept	   of	   constitutional	   patriotism,	   substantially	   coined	   by	  Habermas,	   is	   based	   on	   the	   civic	  
model	  of	   identification,43	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  “political	  culture	  of	  a	  country	  crystallizes	  around	   its	  
constitution”.	   Even	   though	   certain	   constitutional	   principles	   are	   embodied	   in	   more	   than	   just	   one	  
constitution,	   the	   specific	   interpretation	   of	   those	   very	   principles	   is	   what	   underlies	   the	   concept	   of	  
constitutional	   patriotism.	  44	  Within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   it	   is	   ideally	   constitutional	  
patriotism	   that	   should	   take	   the	   place	   that	   was	   originally	   occupied	   by	   nationalism45	  and	   thereby	  
enable	   the	   realization	  of	   implementing	   the	   credo	  of	   “united	   in	   diversity”.46	  Weiler	   on	   the	   contrary	  
argues	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  constitutional	  patriotism	  is	  sort	  of	  exclusive	  and	  defensive	   in	  nature	  and	  he	  
infers	  that	  patriotism	  would	  invite	  people	  to	  defend	  their	  constitutions.	  His	  concept	  of	  constitutional	  
tolerance	   is	   based	   on	   the	   voluntary	   acceptance	   of	   constitutional	   discipline,	   even	   without	   a	  
constitutional	   demos.	   The	   latter	   concept	   is	   likewise	   based	   on	   a	   civic	   understanding	   of	   national	  
identity,	   focusing	  primarily	  on	   the	   tolerance	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  other.	  According	   to	  Weiler,	   constitutional	  
tolerance	  is	  pervading	  the	  idea	  of	  European	  integration,	  as,	  regardless	  of	  how	  close	  the	  Union	  gets,	  it	  
has	   to	   remain	   a	   Union	   “among	   distinct	   peoples,	   distinct	   political	   identities,	   distinct	   political	  
communities“.47	  The	   respect	   for	   and	   the	   preservation	  of	   “the	   other”	   and	   thus	   the	  maintenance	  of	  
different	   (constitutional)	   identities	   instead	  of	   equating	   them,	   is	  what	  underlies	   the	  European	   idea.	  
This	  applies	  equally	  for	  the	  horizontal	  relation	  among	  the	  Member	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  vertical	  
relation	  between	  the	  Union	  and	  its	  Member	  States.	  	  
	  
What	  Weiler	  calls	  “constitutional	  tolerance”	  is	  not	  only	  revealed	  in	  the	  preambles	  to	  the	  TEU	  and	  the	  
TFEU	  that	  are	  referring	  to	  the	  objective	  of	  an	  “ever	  closer	  union	  among	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe”,	  but	  
has	  now	  found	  its	  normative	  expression	  in	  the	  identity	  clause.48	  The	  European	  ideal	   is	  a	  plurality	  of	  
mutually	  tolerating	  national	  constitutional	  systems,	  each	  of	  them	  legitimated	  by	  a	  people,	  by	  means	  
of	   a	   democratic	   process.	   Hence,	   there	   is	   a	   plurality	   of	   political	   spaces	   and	   democracies	   that	   are	  
shaping	   constitutional	   choices	   that	   have	   to	   be	   respected	   by	   the	   respective	   other	   constitutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘collective’	  or	   ‘national	   identities’?	  Are	   there	   two	   types	  of	  national	   identities?	  Does	  Germany	  have	  an	  ethnic	  
identity,	  and	  is	  it	  different?	  European	  Journal	  of	  Sociology	  2002,	  3	  (3	  et	  seq).	  
41	  Ius	  sanguinis	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  the	  more	  inclusive	  ethnic/cultural	  model,	  while	  ius	  loci	  is	  usually	  linked	  to	  the	  
more	  multicultural	  civic/political	  model;	  Gamberale	  (supra	  note	  40)	  637	  et	  seq;	  Peters	  (supra	  note	  40)	  6	  et	  seq.	  
42	  Gamberale	  (supra	  note	  40)	  639;	  Peters	  (supra	  note	  40)	  6.	  
43	  Peters	  (supra	  note	  40)	  19	  et	  seq.	  
44	  Habermas,	  The	  European	  Nation-­‐State:	  On	  the	  Past	  and	  Future	  of	  Sovereignty	  and	  Citizenship,	  in	  Cronin/De	  
Greiff	  (eds),	  The	  Inclusion	  of	  the	  Other.	  Studies	  in	  Political	  Theory,	  2000,	  105	  (118).	  Similar	  Krisch,	  who	  suggests	  
that	   constitutionalism	   has	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   strengthen	   tradition,	   Krisch,	   The	   case	   for	   pluralism	   in	  
postnational	  law,	  in	  Weiler/De	  Búrca	  (supra	  note	  26)	  203	  (207	  et	  seq).	  
45	  Habermas	  (supra	  note	  44)	  118.	  
46 	  While	   patriotism	   typically	   includes	   a	   statement	   about	   national	   pride,	   nationalism	   includes	   one	   about	  
unconditional	  support;	  see	  Miller/Ali	  (supra	  note	  31)	  245.	  
47	  Weiler	  (supra	  note	  29);	  Weiler	  (supra	  note	  26)	  12	  et	  seq.	  
48	  Infra	  V.	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regimes.	  For	  the	  democratic	  processes	  and	  thus	  the	  legitimation	  of	  those	  constitutions,	  some	  sort	  of	  
identification	   of	   the	   respective	   peoples	   is	   essential.	   As	   claimed	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   constitutional	  
tolerance,	   it	   is	   also	   the	   different	   forms	   of	   identification	   that	   have	   to	   be	   respected,	   no	   matter	   if	  
Germany´s	  ethnic/cultural	  identification	  or	  France´s	  civic	  form	  of	  identification	  is	  concerned.	  
	  
Here,	   constitutional	   pluralism	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   theory	   that,	   in	  Maduro’s	   words	   “focuses	   on	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   European	   constitutionalism	   and	   its	   model	   of	   organizing	   power”.49	  The	   Union	   as	   a	  
derivative	   subject	   of	   international	   law	   derives	   its	   legitimacy	   from	   a	   plurality	   of	   interrelating	  
constitutional	   sources.	   This	   finds	   its	   perfect	   expression	   in	   the	   identity	   clause	   that	   imposes	   the	  
obligation	  upon	  the	  Union	  to	  respect	  the	  constitutional	  differences	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  Thus	  the	  
provision	   frames	   one	   of	   the	   bedrocks	   of	   the	   Union’s	   legitimacy.	   Constitutional	   pluralism	   in	   the	  
European	   Union	   context	   is	   therefore	   a	   juxtaposition	   of	   different	   sources	   of	   constitutional	   law,	  
national,	   European	   and	   also	   international,	  where	   no	   ultimate	   source	   of	   hierarchy	   exists.50	  There	   is	  
the	   opinion	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   constitutional	   pluralism	   would	   misconstrue	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
constitutional	   by	   privileging	   the	   pluralist	   asset	   over	   the	   hierarchical.51	  This	   is	   exactly	   the	   point	   –	  
hierarchy	  takes	  a	  backseat	  EU	  constitutional	  pluralism.	  There	   is	  a	  constant	  demarcation,	  balancing,	  
argumentation,	   cooperation,	   mutual	   inspiration	   and	   therefore	   a	   consistent	   process	   of	  
constitutionalization	   as	   suggested	   by	   Shaw 52 ,	   where	   different	   constitutional	   systems	   revealing	  
different	  values	  and	  identities	  are	  steadily	  confronted	  with	  one	  another.	  Once	  this	  process	  comes	  to	  
an	  end,	  the	  fundamental	  idea	  the	  Union	  has	  been	  created	  upon,	  ceases	  to	  exist	  and	  so	  does	  today´s	  
Union.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  there	  would	  be	  a	  real	  European	  Constitution,	  establishing	  a	  formal	  
hierarchy	  among	  the	  different	  constitutional	  systems	  by	  setting	   in	  place	  an	  ultimate	  authority.	  The	  
result	   would	   be	   a	   dramatic	   weakening	   of	   the	   pluralist	   element	   that	   is	   so	   essential	   for	   the	   legal	  
concept	   the	   EU	   is	   built	   upon.	  Of	   course,	   one	   can	   argue	   that	   by	   developing	   the	  doctrines	   of	   direct	  
effect	   and	   supremacy	   and	   its	   actual	   acceptance	   –	   even	   though	   in	   most	   cases	   just	   implicitly	   –	   by	  
national	   constitutional	   courts,	   the	   CJEU	   has	   succeeded	   in	   establishing	   a	   de	   facto	   hierarchy.	  While	  
from	   the	  Union’s	   side	   the	   superiority	  of	  EU	   law	  seems	  uncontested,	   from	   the	   side	  of	   the	  Member	  
States	  it	  is	  another	  story	  that	  has	  been	  told.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  core	  of	  national	  constitutional	  law	  
and	  thus	  to	  the	  norms	  expressing	  the	  very	   identity	  of	  a	  State,	  by	  uncompromisingly	  sticking	  to	  the	  
absolute	  primacy	  doctrine,53	  the	  Union	  will	   face	  a	   legitimacy	  problem	  on	  the	   long	  run.	  The	   form	  of	  
constitutional	   pluralism	   in	   place	   on	   the	   EU	   level	   hampers	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	   collective	   European	  
identity	   however,	   as	   people	   tend	   to	   stick	   to	   their	   national	   constitutions;	   as	   already	   stated,	   this	  
European	  identity	  would	  be	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  democratic	   legitimacy.	  And	  at	  this	  point	  we	  
have	  come	  full	  circle,	  because	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  process	  and	  result	  legitimacy,	  the	  Union	  has	  to	  rely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Maduro,	   The	  Promise	  of	  Constitutional	  Pluralism,	  Paper	  presented	  at	   the	  Colloquium	  "Rethinking	  Law	   in	  a	  
Global	   Context:	   Rethinking	   the	   National/International	   Divide",	   Wissenschaftszentrum	   Berlin	   für	  
Sozialforschung,	   on	   15.5.2012,	   available	   at	  
http://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/veranstaltungen/miguelmadurothreeclaimsofconstitutionalpluralismhu-­‐
collmay152012.pdf.	  
50	  See	  Besson,	  (supra	  note	  28)	  358;	  Sabel/Gerstenberg,	  Constitutionalising	  an	  Overlapping	  Consensus:	  The	  ECJ	  
and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Coordinate	  Constitutional	  Order,	  ELJ	  2010,	  511	  (543).	  
51	  According	   to	  Weiler,	   constitutional	   orders	   „inherently	   contain	   hierarchical	   and	   pluralist	   features“,	  Weiler	  
(supra	  note	  26)	  14	  et	  17;	  Shaw	  (supra	  note	  52)	  588.	  
52	  Shaw,	   Postnational	   Constitutionalism	   in	   the	   European	  Union,	   Journal	   of	   European	   Public	   Policy	   1999,	   579	  
(588);	   see	   also	   Comtesse,	   La	   culture	   politique	   comme	   métavaleur	   européenne,	   in	   Besson/Cheneval/Levrat	  
(supra	  note	  11)	  41	  (50	  et	  seq),	  who	  defines	  the	  political	  discourse	  as	  such	  as	  métavaleur	  européenne.	  
53	  Supra	  note	  36.	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on	  the	  legitimacy	  resources	  of	  the	  Member	  States.54	  Weakening	  those	  very	  resources	  by	  encroaching	  
on	   their	   core	   constitutional	   identities	   would	   as	   a	   result	   weaken	   the	   Union	   itself.	   So	   the	   question	  
arises	  of	  how	  to	  establish	  a	  balance	  between	  national	  and	  EU	  interests.	  
	  
It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  the	  European	  project	  is	  determined	  to	  be	  an	  open	  ended	  and	  dynamic	  process,	  
an	  ever	  closer	  union	  among	   the	  peoples	  of	  Europe.	  But	  where	  are	   the	   limits	   in	  order	   to	  safeguard	  
that	  the	  objective	  remains	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  union	  among	  the	  peoples	  rather	  than	  a	  Union	  of	  
the	  European	  people?	  How	  to	  preserve	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  different	  Member	  States	  and	  thus	  
avoid	   the	   absorption	   of	   their	   identities	   in	   one	   single	   European	   compromise	   of	   values?	   Are	   the	  
Member	  States	  running	  risk	  of	   losing	  their	  own	  identities	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  undertaking	  huge	  
efforts	  to	  define	  and	  strengthen	  the	  Union	  as	  a	  sui	  generis	  construct?	  The	  identity	  clause,	  serving	  as	  
a	  normative	  expression	  of	  constitutional	  pluralism,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  address	  these	  questions	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  legitimizes	  the	  coexistence	  and	  tolerance	  among	  constitutional	  systems	  in	  the	  EU.	  Thus,	  the	  
actual	  interpretation	  of	  the	  identity	  clause	  will	  be	  crucial	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  European	  idea.	  
	  
III.	  Three	  layers	  of	  constitutional	  identity	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  
	  
III.1.	  Identifying	  constitutional	  identity	  
	  
For	   a	   definition	   of	   what	   should	   be	   respected	   under	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   identify	   the	  
different	   types	   of	   constitutional	   identities	   that	   coexist	   within	   the	   European	   Union.	   It	   is	   suggested	  
that	  there	  are	  three	  different	  categories	  of	  identity	  involved;55	  first	  there	  is	  the	  shared	  identity	  of	  the	  
Union	   and	   its	  Member	   States	   that	   serves	   as	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	  Union;	   second,	   it	   is	   evaluated,	  
whether	  there	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Union´s	  identity	  as	  a	  sui	  generis	   international	  organization	  which	  has	  
emancipated	   from	   the	   shared	   identity	   of	   its	   Member	   States;	   finally	   there	   must	   be	   a	   part	   of	   the	  
Member	  States´	  identity	  that	  is	  not	  connected	  to	  their	  EU	  membership	  and	  that	  is	  characteristic	  for	  
every	   single	   State,	  making	   it	   stand	   out	   among	   others.	   Due	   to	   the	   depth	   European	   integration	   has	  
achieved	   today,	   the	   three	   levels	   of	   identity	   are	  mutually	   reinforcing	   and	   inspiring	   each	   other	   and	  
thus	  cannot	  be	  definitely	  separated	  from	  one	  another.	  
	  
To	   start	   with,	   this	   section	   evaluates	   the	   different	   ways	   of	   how	   constitutional	   identity	   should	   be	  
identified	  and	  argues	   that,	   even	   though	   it	   is	  only	   core	  aspects	  of	   identity	   that	   are	   supposed	   to	  be	  
respected	   by	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU,	   its	   scope	   of	   application	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   constitutional	   norms.	   The	  
different	  answers	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  assess	  constitutional	  
identity,56	  largely	   depend	   on	   the	   particular	   perspective;	   thus	   in	   pursuing	   a	   legal,	   a	   political,	   a	  
sociological,	  a	  theological	  or	  an	  economic	  approach,	  one	  might	  come	  up	  with	  five	  different	  responses	  
on	  how	  constitutional	   identity	  should	  be	  defined.	  Even	  though	  all	  subjects	  are	  interrelated	  and	  it	   is	  
not	  possible	  to	  focus	  on	  one	  discipline	  while	  completely	  isolating	  the	  others,	  the	  main	  focus	  here	  lies	  
on	   the	   development	   of	   a	   legal	   reasoning.	   Obviously,	   there	   are	   legal	   systems	   where	   societal	  
regulations	  are	  in	  place,	  that	  even	  though	  formally	  not	  enforceable,	  are	  more	  authoritative	  than	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Cf	  Weiler	  (supra	  note	  4).	  
55	  Similar	   Rodin,	   National	   Identity	   and	   Market	   Freedoms	   after	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon,	   Croatian	   Yearbook	   of	  
European	  Law	  and	  Policy	  2011,	  11	  (14	  et	  seq).	  
56	  For	   instance	  Grewe,	  Methods	   of	   Identification	   of	  National	   Constitutional	   Identity,	   in	   Saiz	   Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  
Llivina	  (supra	  note	  10)	  37.	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law	  itself.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  analysis	  is	  placed	  on	  positive	  law	  however	  and	  its	  understanding	  
of	  identity.	  
	  
As	   mentioned,	   there	   are	   numerous	   ways	   to	   define	   identity;	   the	   obvious	   narrowing	   down	   to	  
normative	  constitutional	  aspects	  of	  identity	  in	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  however,	  suggests	  taking	  constitutionality	  
as	   a	   point	   of	   departure	   for	   the	   further	   evaluation.	   Even	   though	   constitutional	   identity	   forms	   a	  
concept	   of	   EU	   law,	   when	   assessing	   the	   actual	   content	   of	   national	   constitutional	   identity,	   one	  
unavoidably	   has	   to	   encroach	  on	   the	  domestic	   sphere.	   Several	   defining	   factors	   are	   decisive	   for	   the	  
constitutional	  character	  of	  a	  set	  of	  legal	  norms.	  Usually,	  a	  constitution	  is	  enshrined	  in	  one	  or	  several	  
written	   documents,	   it	   determines	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   institutions	   of	   a	   polity	   and	   there	   is	   a	   certain	  
stability	  of	  the	  norms	  that	  form	  the	  superior	  law	  of	  a	  State.57	  	  
	  
One	  of	   the	  most	   obvious	   indicators	   is	   procedural.	   The	  notion	   constitutional	   is	   normally	   used	   for	   a	  
legal	   norm,	   whose	   adoption	   or	   amendment	   is	   subject	   to	   qualified	   procedural	   requirements. 58	  
Procedural	  requirements	  for	  the	  adoption	  and	  amendment	  may	  be	  even	  more	  restrictive	  for	  specific	  
constitutional	  norms	  like	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  (Baugesetze	  or	  Grundprinzipien)	  of	  the	  Austrian	  
Constitution,	  whose	  amendment	  requires	  an	  obligatory	  referendum.59	  In	  some	  States,	  there	  are	  even	  
constitutional	   provisions	   in	   place	   that	   are	   unalterable,	   like	   the	   so-­‐called	   eternity	   clause	   of	   the	  
German	   Basic	   Law.60	  Norms	   of	   the	   latter	   kind	   typically	   serve	   as	   a	   legal	   benchmark	   for	   “normal”	  
constitutional	   law	  and	  of	  course,	  constitutional	   law	  of	  constituent	  states	   in	  a	   federation	  and	  single	  
statutory	   law	  have	  to	  be	   in	  compliance	  with	  them.	  Furthermore,	   the	  definition	  of	   the	  notion	  could	  
also	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  formal	  designation	  of	  a	  provision	  as	  constitutional,61	  to	  the	  publication	  within	  a	  
prescribed	  publication	  organ	  or	   to	   the	   institutions	  competent	   to	  adopt	   it	  or	   that	  are	  competent	   to	  
decide	  on	  its	  validity.	  
	  
The	  differentiation	  between	  the	  diachronic	  and	  synchronic	  meaning	  of	  the	  notion	  identity,	  as	  defined	  
by	   Reestman,	   is	   another	   possibility	   for	   the	   identification	   of	   constitutional	   norms	   that	   are	   to	   be	  
qualified	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   the	   identity	   of	   a	   political	   community.	   While	   the	   former	   meaning	  
concerns	  the	  “permanence	  through	  time	  or	  continuity”,	   the	   latter	  concerns	  the	  characteristics	  that	  
make	  one	  entity	  different	  by	   comparison	   to	   another.62	  If	   a	  norm	  has	  been	  widely	   accepted	  by	   the	  
population	  and	  has	  been	  in	  place	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  differentiates	  an	  
entity	   from	   others,	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   form	   an	   expression	   of	   constitutional	   identity.	   The	   synchronic	  
meaning	   of	   constitutional	   identity,	   ie	   its	   differentiating	   effect,	   is	   often	   relativized	   however.	   There	  
may	  be	  elements	  constitutive	   for	   the	  collective	   identity	  of	  a	  community	   that	  are	  at	   the	  same	  time	  
part	   of	   the	   identity	   of	   another.	   Language	  may	   serve	   as	   an	   example	   here;	   even	   though	   shared	   by	  
others,	   it	   is	   still	   constitutive	   for	   the	   identity	   of	   every	   single	   State.	   Thus,	   identity	   can	   be	   either	  
understood	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  differentiating	  one	  community	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  other,	  or	  in	  an	  inclusive	  way,	  
in	   the	   sense	   of	   comprising	   all	   elements	   that	   are	   constitutive	   for	   identity,	   including	   those	   that	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  See	  also	  Peters,	  Compensatory	  Constitutionalism:	  The	  Function	  and	  Potential	  of	  Fundamental	   International	  
Norms	  and	  Structures,	  Leiden	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  2006,	  579	  (584	  et	  seq).	  
58	  For	  instance	  Craig,	  Constitutions,	  Constitutionalism,	  and	  the	  European	  Union,	  ELJ	  2001,	  125	  (126	  et	  seq).	  
59	  Art	  44(3)	  B-­‐VG.	  
60	  Art	  79(3)	  GG.	  
61 	  Eg	   Art	   44(1)	   B-­‐VG	   determining	   that	   constitutional	   provisions	   have	   to	   be	   expressly	   designated	   as	  
constitutional	  by	  adding	  the	  prefix	  Verfassungs-­‐	  (constitutional-­‐).	  
62	  Reestman,	  The	  Lissabon-­‐Urteil:	  The	  Franco-­‐German	  Constitutional	  Divide,	  EuConst	  2009,	  374	  (377).	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shared	   by	   other	   communities.63	  What	   follows	   from	   the	   subsequent	   differentiation	   between	   three	  
layers	   of	   constitutional	   identity	   on	   the	   EU	   level64	  is	   that	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   suggests	   a	   predominantly	  
exclusionist	  approach	  by	  understanding	  constitutional	   identity	  as	  being	  first	  and	  foremost	  triggered	  
by	  differences	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  other.65	  
	  
Given	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   constitutional	   law	   within	   28	   Member	   States,	   none	   of	   the	  
abovementioned	   criteria	   in	   itself	   suffices	   to	   define	   constitutional	   identity	   however;66	  it	   is	   rather	   a	  
combination	  of	  the	  different	  factors	  that	   is	  decisive.	  Therefore,	   it	  has	  to	  be	  evaluated	  on	  a	  case	  by	  
case	  basis,	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  specific	  provision	  is	  standing	  out	  among	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  body	  of	  law,	  if	  it	  
is	  continuously	  imprinting	  the	  whole	  legal	  order	  and	  substantively	  reflecting	  fundamental	  principles	  
and	  values	  inherent	  in	  a	  particular	  legal	  regime.	  Especially	  the	  judgments	  of	  national	  courts	  have	  to	  
be	  taken	  into	  account,	  whenever	  they	  interpret	  national	  constitutional	   law	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	   likely	  to	  
shape	   constitutional	   identity.	   While	   not	   every	   constitutional	   norm	   automatically	   serves	   as	   an	  
expression	   of	   the	   identity	   of	   a	   State	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU67	  for	   this	   would	   result	   in	   a	  
discrimination	   of	   Member	   States	   with	   less	   substantial	   constitutions, 68 	  the	   expression	   and	  
specification	  of	   constitutional	   identity	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   constitutional	   law.	   Thus,	   given	   they	   specify	  
fundamental	  choices	  of	  a	  people,	   it	   is	   judicial	  and	   legislative	  acts	   that	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  when	  
assessing,	   if	   a	   specific	   norm	   forms	   part	   of	   the	   constitutional	   identity	   of	   a	   State.69	  Given	   the	   static	  
character	  of	   constitutional	   law	  by	  owed	   to	  qualified	  procedural	   requirements,	   the	   inclusion	  of	   the	  
latter	   acts	   is	   essential	   for	   the	   consideration	   of	   sociopolitical	   dynamics	   within	   the	   limits	   of	  
constitutional	   law.	  A	  mere	   formal	  or	  procedural	  assessment	   is	   therefore	  not	  appropriate,	  nor	   is	  an	  
evaluation	  limited	  to	  the	  content	  of	  a	  norm.	  
	  
III.2.	  Member	  States´	  common	  (shared)	  identity	  
	  
According	  to	  Art	  2	  TEU	  the	  Union	  “is	  founded	  on	  the	  values	  of	  respect	  for	  human	  dignity,	  freedom,	  
democracy,	   equality,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   respect	   for	   human	   rights	   (…)”;	   since	   those	   values	   are	  
“common	   to	   the	  Member	   States”,	   the	   respect	   for	   those	   values	   serves	   as	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   future	  
accessions.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Union´s	  external	  action,	  Art	  21	  TEU	  replicates	  these	  values	  that	  are	  
shared	   by	  most	   liberal-­‐democratic	   systems	   –	   similar	   values	   are	   found	   in	   various	   constitutions	   and	  
statutes,	  solemnly	  proclaimed,	   in	  different	  wording	  though.	  Especially	  the	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  
has	  acquired	  the	  status	  of	  an	  almost	  universal	  value.	  Therefore,	  from	  an	  exclusionist	  point	  of	  view,	  
these	   values	   are	   not	   suitable	   to	   coin	   the	   shared	   identity	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   to	   the	   effect	   of	  
differentiating	  them	  and	  making	  them	  stand	  out	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  cooperation.	  But	  if	  shared	  by	  so	  
many	   other	   States	   and	   international	   organizations,	   if	   contained	   in	   numerous	   constitutions	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  See	  in	  this	  context	  the	  differentiation	  between	  similarity	  and	  singularity	  in	  Grewe,	  Methods	  of	  Identification	  
of	  National	  Constitutional	  Identity,	  in	  Saiz	  Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  Llivina	  (supra	  note	  10)	  37	  (37	  et	  seq)	  with	  further	  
references.	  
64	  Infra	  III.	  
65	  Similar	  Besselink,	  National	  and	  constitutional	  identity	  before	  and	  after	  Lisbon,	  Utrecht	  Law	  Review	  2010,	  36	  
(47).	  
66	  See	  the	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  constitutional	  (case)	  law	  in	  the	  Member	  States,	  Grewe	  (supra	  note	  56)	  40	  et	  seq.	  
67	  According	  to	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill,	  not	  every	  provision	  of	  domestic	  constitutional	  law	  has	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  
part	   of	   a	   Member	   State´s	   constitutional	   identity;	   in	   their	   opinion,	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   covers	   the	   basic	   domestic	  
constitutional	  features	  only;	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1431	  et	  seq.	  
68	  See	   the	   Opinion	   of	   AG	   Maduro	   in	   Case	   C-­‐213/07,	   Michaniki	   AE	   v	   Ethniko	   Symvoulio	   Radiotileorasis	   and	  
Ypourgos	  Epikrateias,	  ECR	  2008,	  I-­‐9999,	  para	  33.	  
69	  More	  restrictive	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1430.	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preambles	  of	  international	  agreements	  –	  if	  they	  are	  all	  respecting	  human	  rights,	  democracy	  and	  the	  
rule	   of	   law,	   what	   constitutes	   the	   material	   difference	   in	   substance	   of	   the	   identity	   of	   a	   particular	  
entity?	   Here,	   it	   is	   what	   Habermas	   associates	   with	   constitutional	   patriotism,	   namely	   the	   specific	  
interpretation	  of	  those	  principles70	  and	  values	  within	  a	  specific	  legal	  order	  what	  is	  decisive	  and	  what	  
makes	  people	  feel	  attached	  to	  their	  constitutions.	  	  
	  
Even	   though	   in	   principle	   the	   values	   are	   shared,	   there	   is	   discretion	   left	   for	   their	   implementation	  
within	  a	  particular	  historical,	  cultural	  and	  social	  context.	  What	  the	  six	  founding	  States	  shared	  back	  in	  
the	  1950s	  was	  their	  common	  past	   in	  a	  war	  torn	  continent,	  their	   lessons	   learnt	  from	  the	  carnage	  of	  
the	   Second	  World	  War	   and	   their	   hunger	   for	   peace.	   Against	   this	   background,	   the	   founding	   States	  
decided	   to	   translate	   their	   common	   values	   into	   a	   legal	   document	   that	   to	   this	   day	   has	   significantly	  
increased	  in	  substance.	  The	  common	  identity	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  Union,	  as	  it	  stands	  today,	  
is	  not	  only	   revealed	  by	   the	  explicitly	  enumerated	  values	  and	   their	   corresponding	   interpretation	  by	  
the	   national	   constitutional	   courts,	   but	   also	   by	   the	   ideas	   of	   solidarity	   and	   peace,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
constitutional	  tolerance	  among	  the	  States,	  the	  willingness	  to	  accept	  compromises	  and	  the	  readiness	  
to	   comply	  with	  decisions	   that	  were	   taken	  by	   a	  majority	   of	   States	  on	   some	  occasions	   even	  against	  
one´s	   own	   will	   for	   a	   peaceful	   common	   future.	   This	   common	   identity	   of	   the	   Member	   States	  
constitutes	  the	  fundament	  on	  which	  the	  European	  construct	  is	  built	  upon	  and	  therefore	  it	  serves	  also	  
as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Union´s	  own	  identity.	  
	  
III.3.	  Sui	  generis	  identity	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
	  
While	  in	  the	  1950s	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  European	  project	  was	  essentially	  reflecting	  the	  common	  set	  of	  
values	  and	   the	  core	   constitutional	  principles	  of	   the	   founding	  States,71	  the	  question	  arises,	  whether	  
the	  identity	  of	  the	  Union	  continues	  to	  be	  an	  amalgam	  of	  the	  28	  different	   identities	  of	  the	  Member	  
States	   or	   if	   to	   date	   some	   sort	   of	   collective	   identity	   has	   emerged.	   Is	   Delanty	   right,	   when	   he	  
determines	  that	  European	  identity	  would	  not	  have	  existed	  prior	  to	  its	  definition	  and	  codification?	  He	  
qualifies	   it	  as	  a	  “doubtful	  construct	  (…)	  given	  the	  apparent	   irresolvable	  conflict	  of	  national	  cultures	  
and	  oppositional	  collective	  identities.”72	  Is	  it	  a	  lack	  of	  identity	  that	  results	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  identification	  by	  
the	  citizens?	  
	  
It	   is	  uncontested	  that	  the	  Member	  States	  have	  to	  respect	  the	  Union	  with	  all	   it	  entails.	  When	  it	  was	  
created	  by	  means	  of	   international	  treaties,	   it	  was	  unpredictable	  that	  this	  project	  would	  turn	  out	  to	  
be	   a	   sui	   generis	   subject	   of	   international	   law,	   different	   from	   all	   other	   international	   organizations	  
hitherto.	  The	  primary	  objective	  was	   to	  establish	   long-­‐term	  peace	  by	  means	  of	   factual	   technocratic	  
cooperation	   in	   economic	   areas.	   In	   the	   course	   of	   the	   deepening	   of	   European	   integration,	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  project	  grew	  and	  soon	  the	  focus	  was	  not	  only	  on	  the	  question	  how	  this	  construct	  
should	   function	   and	   be	   perceived	   from	   within,	   but	   also	   how	   it	   should	   be	   positioned	   on	   the	  
international	   plane	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   international	   community.	   What	   is	   this	   sui	   generis	   player	   in	  
international	  relations,	  what	  are	  the	  values	  it	  stands	  for,	  what	  ideal	  does	  it	  represent,	  how	  to	  define	  
its	  identity?	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  See	  Habermas	  (supra	  note	  44).	  
71	  Calliess	  (supra	  note	  12)	  1377	  et	  seq.	  
72	  Delanty,	  Inventing	  Europe.	  Idea,	  Identity,	  Reality,	  1995,	  3;	  Fleurant,	  L’identité	  europeénne:	  Un	  débat	  qui	  met	  
en	  lumière	  les	  difficulties	  conceptuelles	  de	  l’identité,	  Horizons	  philosophiques	  2001,	  58	  (64).	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Explicit	  references	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  Union	  in	  the	  Treaties	  are	  rare	  and	  can	  be	  found	  only	  within	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  (CFSP).73	  This	  is	  remarkable,	  as	  it	  seems	  that	  
the	  authors	  of	  the	  Treaties	  are	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  strengthening	  the	  Union’s	  
identity	  for	  the	  assertion	  of	  its	  role	  as	  a	  strong	  international	  player.74	  Nevertheless,	  the	  whole	  body	  
of	  EU	  law	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  objective	  of	  shaping	  and	  strengthening	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  organization;	  
as	   such	   it	   requires	   commitment	   and	   respect	   from	   the	  Member	   States.	   They	   have	   to	   respect	   the	  
obligatory	  jurisdiction	  of	  a	  powerful	  and	  proactive	  European	  Court	  that	  has	  developed	  several	   legal	  
doctrines	   whose	   impact	   on	   the	   Member	   States´	   sovereignty	   is	   immense,	   be	   it	   direct	   effect,	  
supremacy	   or	   state	   liability,	   all	   destined	   to	   safeguard	   a	   uniform	   and	   effective	   application	   and	  
implementation	  of	  EU	   law;	   they	  have	  to	  accept	   the	   independent	  role	  of	   the	  European	  Commission	  
and	   its	   powerful	   status	   in	   terms	   of	   legislative	   initiative;	   they	   have	   to	   consider	   their	   duty	   to	   act	  
coherently	   on	   the	   international	   plane	   and	   to	   consider	   the	   interest	   of	   the	  Union,	   instead	   of	   acting	  
exclusively	  in	  their	  own	  interest;	  they	  have	  to	  respect	  the	  binding	  character	  of	  decisions	  taken	  by	  a	  
majority	   of	   States,	   even	   if	   they	   themselves	   disagree.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   principle	   of	   sincere	  
cooperation,75	  Member	  States	  not	  only	  have	  to	  respect,	  but	  they	  also	  have	  to	  actively	  contribute	  to	  
the	  realization	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaties	  by	  implementing	  legal	  acts	  into	  their	  domestic	  legal	  
order,	  even	  though	  they	  were	  adopted	  by	  procedures	  are	  not	  in	  line	  with	  the	  democratic	  standards	  
that	   are	   taken	   for	   granted	   on	   the	   domestic	   level.	   It	   seems	   that	   mere	   endless	   respectfulness	   and	  
strenuous	   efforts	   from	   the	   Member	   State´s	   side	   were	   required	   in	   order	   to	   create,	   shape	   and	  
strengthen	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  unique	  and	  ever	  evolving	  construct,	  whose	  final	  aim	  is	  still	  to	  be	  defined.	  
Of	   course,	   in	   the	   globalized	   world	   of	   today,	   in	   a	   post-­‐national	   environment,	   the	   overcoming	   of	  
States´	  borders	  and	  the	  steadily	  increasing	  interdependence,	  intensified	  cooperation	  among	  States	  is	  
essential	   and	   therefore	   unexceptionable.	   The	   benefits	   are	   undisputed.	   But	   still,	   the	   depth	   of	  
cooperation	  and	  the	  efforts	  required	  to	  create	  and	  strengthen	  the	  Union	  and	  to	  build	  its	  identity	  has	  
never	   been	   seen	   before	   in	   international	   relations.	   It	   requires	   not	   only	   an	   incredible	   amount	   of	  
respect,	  subjection,	  tolerance	  and	  trust	  among	  the	  participating	  States,	  but	  also	  the	  support	  from	  the	  
citizens	  that	  have	  to	  stand	  firm	  behind	  the	  project.	  
	  
Due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   driving	   impetus	   for	   the	   cooperation	  was	   to	   establish	   long-­‐term	   peace	   in	  
Europe,	  peace	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  one	  of	  the	  dominant	  values	  expressed	  by	  the	  European	  
project.	  Since	  nowadays	  peace	  is	  taken	  for	  granted,	  the	  original	  objective	  has	  taken	  a	  backseat,	  while	  
economic	  cooperation	  has	  evolved	  from	  a	  means	  to	  realize	  this	  very	  objective	  to	  the	  actual	  driving	  
impetus	   for	   integration.	   Whereas	   peace	   as	   one	   of	   the	   most	   fundamental	   values	   of	   European	  
integration	  is	  not	  explicitly	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  value	  of	  the	  Union	  in	  Art	  2	  TEU,	  the	  promotion	  of	  peace	  in	  
its	  external	  dimension	  is	  still	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  concerns	  of	  the	  Union	  however.76	  Another	  value	  that	  
pervades	  the	  whole	  European	  project	  and	  that	  serves	  as	  a	  founding	  principle	  is	  tolerance.	  As	  referred	  
to	  by	   the	  principle	   of	   constitutional	   tolerance	   coined	  by	  Weiler,77	  what	   is	   required	   is	   tolerance	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  The	  explicit	  reference	  to	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  Union	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  CFSP	  as	  provided	  for	  by	  ex-­‐Art	  2	  
and	  Art	  27a(1)	  TEU	   (Nice	  version	  of	   the	  Treaties;	   consolidated	   text	   in	  OJ	  2002	  C	  325)	  was	  eliminated.	   In	   the	  
current	   version	   of	   the	   Treaties,	   it	   is	   only	   the	   Preamble	   of	   the	   TEU	   that	  mentions	   the	   identity	   of	   the	  Union,	  
according	   to	  which	  a	  CFSP	   including	  a	   common	  defence	  policy	   should	  be	   implemented,	   “thereby	   reinforcing	  
the	  European	  identity”.	  
74	  See	  also	  Art	  B(1)	  TEU	  (Maastricht	  version).	  
75	  Millet	   sees	   that	   the	   reciprocal	   dimension	   of	   the	   principle	   was	   reinforced	   by	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon,	  Millet,	  
L`Union	  Européenne	  et	  l`Identité	  Constitutionelle	  des	  États	  Membres,	  2013,	  83	  et	  seq.	  
76	  See	  Art	  3(1)	  and	  (5)	  TEU,	  Art	  8(1)	  TEU,	  Art	  21(2)	  lit	  c	  TEU.	  
77	  Supra	  note	  29.	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decisions	   taken	  by	  other	  States	  having	  a	  huge	   impact	  on	  oneself.	  Not	  enough,	   there	   is	   the	  specific	  
meaning	   of	   solidarity, 78 	  mutual	   trust,	   respect	   for	   linguistic	   diversity,	   the	   Union´s	   particular	  
understanding	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  system	  of	  constitutional	  pluralism	  that	  coin	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  
Union.	   Apart	   from	   that,	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   free	   movement	   rules	   and	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐
discrimination	  constitute	  other	  essential	  features	  coining	  the	  sui	  generis	  identity	  of	  the	  Union.79	  Even	  
though	  contained	  in	  all	  Member	  States´	  legal	  orders,	  non-­‐discrimination	  has	  outstanding	  significance	  
in	  the	  EU	  and	  is	  awarded	  with	  a	  fundamental	  status	  in	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  CJEU.	  
	  
Against	   the	   background	   of	   the	   Union´s	   wide	   ranging	   competences	   paired	   with	   its	   proactive	   and	  
powerful	  Court,	  it	  seems	  that	  today,	  after	  more	  than	  60	  years	  of	  integration,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  first	  and	  
foremost	   the	  Member	   States	   coining	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   Union,	   but	   rather	   the	   Union	   coining	   the	  
identity	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  While	  for	  a	  long	  time	  it	  was	  the	  respect	  and	  the	  tolerance	  from	  the	  
Member	   States	   that	   was	   decisive	   for	   shaping	   the	   EU	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   by	   the	   incorporation	   of	   a	  
judicially	   enforceable	   identity	   clause,	   it	   is	   now	   the	  Member	   States´	   turn	   to	   claim	   respect	   for	   their	  
most	  fundamental	  constitutional	  choices.	  
	  
III.4.	  Member	  States’	  individual	  constitutional	  identities	  
	  
Given	  the	  set	  of	  values	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  it	  is	  again	  the	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  those	  
values,	   the	   political	   choices	   by	   the	   peoples	   and	   subsequently	   of	   national	   legislators	   within	   a	  
particular	  legal	  system	  that	  is	  constitutive	  for	  its	  identity.80	  Thus,	  what	  is	  identity	  creating	  is	  not	  the	  
proclamation	   and	   prescription	   of	   ever	   replicated	   principles,	   but	   their	   interpretation	   and	  
implementation.	  The	  specific	  understanding	  is	  the	  product	  of	  historical,	  cultural,	  religious	  and	  social	  
impetus.	  One	  may	   just	   look	   at	  Austria	   and	   Switzerland;	   they	   are	  both	   States	  with	  well-­‐established	  
democratic	  structures.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  not	  democracy	  as	  such,	  but	  the	  particular	  Swiss	  understanding	  of	  
democracy	  that	   is	  constitutive	  for	  the	  very	   identity	  of	  that	  State.	  Another	  typical	  element	  essential	  
for	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  State	  is	  its	  language	  regime,81	  which	  is	  in	  most	  cases	  established	  constitutionally.	  
	  
National	  courts	  do	  not	   follow	  a	  strictly	  exclusionist	  approach	  to	  constitutional	   identity	   in	  the	  sense	  
that	   it	   is	   only	   the	   differentiating	   elements	   that	   count;	   according	   to	   them,	   what	   belongs	   to	  
constitutional	  identity,	  is	  inter	  alia	  the	  statehood	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	  the	  key	  requirements	  of	  the	  
rule	  of	  law,	  the	  principle	  of	  democracy	  and	  if	  applicable	  the	  federalist	  principle.82	  Given	  the	  big	  share	  
of	   commonalities	   in	   the	   identities	  of	   the	  Member	   States	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Union	   is	  built	   upon	  
those	   common	   constitutional	   values,	   for	   identity	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   it	   is	   certainly	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Keating	  describes	  Europe	  as	  “a	  symbol	  of	  postwar	  prosperity	  and	  the	  consumer	  society	  but	  also	  a	  place	  of	  
social	   solidarity,	   distinguishing	   from	   the	   US	   precisely	   on	   this”,	   Keating,	   National	   and	   Regional	   Identities	   in	  
Europe,	  Contemporary	  European	  History	  2007,	  407	  (410).	  
79	  Sarmiento	  identifies	  “three	  normative	  ideals”,	  namely	  democracy,	  rights	  and	  solidarity	  that	  would	  “comprise	  
at	   its	   most	   abstract	   level	   all	   the	   values	   and	   principles	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Treaties”;	   Sarmiento,	   The	   EU´s	  
Constitutional	  Core,	  in	  Saiz	  Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  Llivina	  (supra	  note	  10)	  177	  (179	  et	  seq).	  
80	  Cf	  Habermas	  on	  constitutional	  patriotism	  (supra	  note	  44).	  
81	  See	   the	   final	   report	   of	  Working	   Group	   V	   on	   Complementary	   Competencies	   of	   the	   European	   Convention,	  
4.11.2002,	  Doc	  CONV	  375/1/02	  REV	  1,	  10	   (11);	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Maduro	   in	  Case	  C-­‐160/03,	  Kingdom	  of	  Spain	  v	  
Eurojust,	   ECR	   2005,	   I-­‐2077,	   para	   35,	   according	   to	   whom	   the	   respect	   for	   linguistic	   diversity,	   being	   of	  
fundamental	  importance,	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  respect,	  the	  Union	  owes	  to	  the	  national	  identities	  of	  the	  Member	  
States.	  
82	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1435	  et	  seq.	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differentiating	  characteristics	  that	  are	  more	  decisive	  however.	  This	  becomes	  evident	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	  national	  systems	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  protection.	  
	  
It	   is	   undisputed	   that	   the	   core	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   enshrined	   within	   domestic	   constitutions	   and	  
their	   specific	   interpretations	  by	  national	   courts	  are	  constitutive	   for	  national	   constitutional	   identity,	  
since	   they	   reveal	   most	   essential	   and	   sensitive	   choices	   of	   a	   people.	   Their	   importance	   has	   been	  
accepted	  by	  the	  CJEU	  at	  an	  early	  stage,	  since	  the	  BVerfG	  in	  Solange	  I	  held	  that	  fundamental	  rights	  are	  
at	  the	  core	  of	  national	  identity.83	  The	  consequence	  drawn	  by	  the	  CJEU	  from	  this	  ruling	  was	  that	  since	  
then	   fundamental	   rights	   could	   be	   invoked	   as	   justifications	   for	   violations	   of	   EU	   law.	   Today,	  
membership	  to	  the	  ECHR	  serves	  as	  a	  precondition	  for	  accession	  to	  the	  Union	  and	  thus,	  all	  Member	  
States	   –	   and	   in	   the	   foreseeable	   future	   even	   the	   Union	   itself	   –	   are	   parties	   to	   that	   Convention.	  
Furthermore,	  as	  EU	   law	  currently	  stands,	   there	  are	  other	  sources	  of	  EU	  fundamental	   rights,	  whose	  
scope	   of	   application	   seems	   to	   be	   consistently	   broadened	   by	   the	   CJEU;84	  there	   is	   the	   CFREU	   and	  
unwritten	   general	   principles	   of	   law	   including	   the	   rights	   as	   provided	   for	   by	   the	   ECHR	   –	   all	   of	   them	  
enjoying	   primacy	   over	   national	   law.	   So	   what	   remains	   for	   the	   substance	   of	   Member	   States´	  
fundamental	  rights	  apart	  from	  the	  mainstream	  pulp	  of	  ever	  replicated	  similar	  rights	  and	  principles?	  
Indeed,	   fundamental	   rights	   guarantees	   flowing	   from	   different	   sources	   are	   mostly	   interrelated,	  
congruent	  or	  at	  least	  similarly	  framed;	  thus	  it	  is	  again	  first	  and	  foremost	  the	  interpretation	  and	  legal	  
specification	  of	  these	  very	  rights	  that	   is	  substantially	  varying	  from	  one	  Member	  State	  to	  the	  other.	  
One	  may	  just	  think	  of	  the	  freedom	  of/from	  religion	  constituting	  a	  fundamental	  right	  under	  the	  ECHR	  
and	   the	   CFREU	   and	   the	   still	   existing	   different	   constitutional	   arrangements	   with	   regard	   to	   the	  
separation	  of	   church	   and	   State	   in	   some	  States.	   Even	   though	  all	  Member	   States	  have	   incorporated	  
similar	  principles	  in	  their	  national	  legal	  orders,	  it	  is	  the	  interpretation	  of	  those	  principles	  that	  allows	  
for	  different	  arrangements	  regarding	  sensitive	  issues	  like	  gay	  marriage,	  abortion,	  assisted	  suicide	  and	  
surrogacy	  in	  the	  Member	  States.85	  	  
	  
The	  ECtHR,	  whose	   judgments	  are	  decisively	   imprinting	  the	  actual	   interpretation	  of	  EU	  fundamental	  
rights,	  allows	  for	  this	  diversity	  by	  means	  of	  its	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  doctrine.	  The	  Grand	  Chamber´s	  
decision	   in	   Lautsi,	   a	   case	   concerned	   with	   the	   presence	   of	   crucifixes	   in	   classrooms	   and	   its	  
compatibility	   with	   the	   freedom	   of/from	   religion,	   may	   serve	   as	   an	   example	   here.	   Following	   an	  
intervention	  by	  Weiler,	  who	  represented	  the	  intervening	  States	  and	  who	  insisted	  on	  the	  importance	  
of	  tolerance	  for	  diversity	  within	  the	  European	  arrangement,	  the	  Chamber	  decision	  was	  turned	  down.	  
By	  taking	  into	  account	  of	  „the	  fact	  that	  Europe	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  great	  diversity	  between	  the	  States	  of	  
which	   it	   is	   composed,	  particularly	   in	   the	   sphere	  of	   cultural	   and	  historical	  development”,	   the	  Court	  
took	  the	  view	  that	  the	  decision	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  perpetuate	  a	  tradition	  „falls	  in	  principle	  within	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  BVerfG	  37,	  271,	  29.5.1974,	  Solange	  I;	  see	  Torres	  Pérez	  for	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  other	  national	  constitutional	  
courts,	  Torres	   Pérez,	   Constitutional	   Identity	   and	   Fundamental	   Rights:	   the	   Intersection	   between	  Art	   4(2)	   TEU	  
and	  53	  Charter,	  in	  Saiz	  Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  Llivina	  (supra	  note	  10)	  141	  (143	  et	  seq).	  
84	  Case	   C-­‐555/07,	   Seda	   Kücükdeveci	   v	   Swedex	   GmbH	   &	   Co.	   KG,	   ECR,	   2010,	   I-­‐365;	   Case	   C-­‐144/04,	  Werner	  
Mangold	  v	  Rüdiger	  Helm,	  ECR	  2005,	  I-­‐9981;	  Case	  C-­‐115/08,	  Land	  Oberösterreich	  v	  ČEZ;	  ECR	  2009,	  I-­‐10265.	  See	  
for	   instance	  De	  Mol,	   Kücükdeveci:	  Mangold	  Revisited	   –	  Horizontal	  Direct	   Effect	   of	   a	  General	   Principle	   of	   EU	  
Law:	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Grand	  Chamber)	  Judgment	  of	  19	  January	  2010,	  Case	  C-­‐¬555/07,	  
Seda	   Kücükdeveci	   v.	   Swedex	   GmbH	   &	   Co.	   KG.,	   EuConst	   2010,	   293;	   Seifert,	   Mangold	   und	   kein	   Ende:	   die	  
Entscheidung	   der	   Großen	   Kammer	   des	   EuGH	   v.	   19.1.2010	   in	   der	   Rechtssache	   Kücükdeveci,	   EuR	   2010,	   802;	  
Obwexer,	  Der	  Schutz	  der	  Grundrechte	  durch	  den	  Gerichtshof	  der	  EU	  nach	  Lissabon.	  Auslegung	  und	  Anwendung	  
der	  Grundrechte-­‐Charta	  gegenüber	  EU-­‐Organen,	  den	  Mitgliedstaaten	  und	  dem	  allgemeinen	  Völkerrecht,	  ZÖR	  
2013,	  487.	  
85	  On	  the	  different	  types	  of	  Member	  States´	  constitutional	  identities,	  Millet	  (supra	  note	  75)	  106	  et	  seq.	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margin	  of	  appreciation	  of	  the	  respondent	  State“.86	  In	  ABC	  v	  Ireland,	  where	  Irish	  abortion	  law	  was	  at	  
stake,	   the	  ECtHR	  held	   that	   the	  prohibition	   in	   Ireland	  of	  abortion	   for	  health	  and	  well-­‐being	   reasons	  
was	  based	  „on	  the	  profound	  moral	  views	  of	  the	  Irish	  people	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  life	  (...)	  and	  (...)	  the	  
consequent	  protection	  to	  be	  accorded	  to	  the	  right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  unborn“	  and	  as	  such	  does	  not	  exceed	  
the	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  accorded	  to	  the	  Irish	  State.87	  Looking	  at	  cases	  such	  as	  Schmidberger	  and	  
Omega,	  one	  will	  observe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  similarity	  in	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  CJEU,	  when	  it	  holds	  that	  the	  need	  
for,	  and	  proportionality	  of	  a	  national	  provision	  intended	  to	  ensure	  a	  specific	  standard	  of	  fundamental	  
rights	   protection	   is	   not	   excluded	   “merely	   because	   one	   Member	   State	   has	   chosen	   a	   system	   of	  
protection	   different	   from	   that	   adopted	   by	   another	   State”	   and	   in	   conclusion	   gave	   precedence	   to	  
fundamental	   rights	   in	   relation	   to	   conflicting	  market	   freedoms	   after	   balancing	   the	   interests	   against	  
one	   another. 88 	  Of	   course,	   there	   are	   major	   differences	   between	   the	   ECHR	   fundamental	   rights	  
arrangement	  and	  that	  of	   the	  EU,	  not	   least	   that	  unlike	   the	  EU	  Treaties	   the	  ECHR	  does	  not	  explicitly	  
claim	  respect	  for	  national	  identity;	  it	  is	  rather	  implicitly	  that	  national	  peculiarities	  are	  considered	  by	  
the	  Convention	   system,	  when	  eg	  Art	  26(4)	  ECHR	  determines	   that	   in	   specific	   cases,	  national	   judges	  
can	  or	  have	  to	  be	  appointed	  ex-­‐officio	  members	  to	  the	  bench.89	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  idea	  that	  due	  to	  
their	   expertise	   national	   authorities	   are	   better	   suited	   to	   assess	   the	   importance	   of	   State	   specific	  
peculiarities,	  is	  equally	  true	  for	  the	  EU;	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  respect	  for	  national	  identities	  is	  claimed	  not	  
only	  by	  the	  TEU,	  but	  additionally	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  context	  of	  fundamental	  rights.	  The	  preamble	  of	  
the	  Charter	  stresses	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  and	  develop	  common	  values	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  claims	  
that	  the	  Union	  has	  to	  respect	  “the	  diversity	  of	  the	  cultures	  and	  traditions	  of	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe	  as	  
well	  as	  their	  national	  identities”.	  Apart	  from	  that,	  the	  Günstigkeitsklausel	  in	  Art	  53	  CFREU	  is	  intended	  
to	   protect	   the	   specific	   levels	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   protection	   provided	   for	   in	   Member	   States’	  
constitutions,	   by	   determining	   that	   nothing	   in	   the	   Charter	   “shall	   be	   interpreted	   as	   restricting	   or	  
adversely	  affecting	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  as	  recognized,	  in	  their	  respective	  fields	  
of	   application,	   by	   Union	   law	   and	   international	   law	   and	   by	   international	   agreements	   to	   which	   the	  
Union	  or	  all	  the	  Member	  States	  are	  party,	   including	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  (ECHR)90	  and	  by	  the	  Member	  States'	  constitutions“.91	  
	  
It	   is	  one	  of	   the	  essential	  benefits	  of	   federal	   systems	  –	  on	   the	  EU	   level	  guaranteed	  by	   the	  effective	  
implementation	  of	  free	  movement	  –	  that	  mobile	  citizens	  are	  enabled	  “to	  move	  from	  one	  jurisdiction	  
to	   another,	   sorting	   themselves	   into	   the	   various	   jurisdictions	   that	   best	   satisfy	   their	   individual	  
preferences“,	   in	   short:	   to	   vote	   by	   their	   feet.92	  They	   can	   pick	   and	   choose	   among	   the	   different	  
fundamental	  rights	  arrangements	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  thereby	  escape	  certain	  democratic	  choices	  reflected	  
by	  the	  specific	  interpretation	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  within	  the	  legal	  orders	  of	  their	  Member	  States	  of	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  Lautsi	  v	  Italy,	  App	  No	  30814/06.	  See	  for	  instance	  Weiler,	  Lautsi:	  A	  reply,	  ICON	  2013,	  230.	  
87	  ABC	  v	  Ireland,	  App	  No	  25579/06,	  para	  241.	  
88	  Case	  C-­‐112/09,	  Schmidberger	  v	  Republik	  Österreich,	  ECR	  2003,	  I-­‐5659;	  Case	  C-­‐36/02,	  Omega	  Spielhallen-­‐	  und	  
Automaten	  Aufstellungs-­‐GmbH	  v	  Oberbürgermeisterin	  der	  Bundesstadt	  Bonn,	  ECR	  2004,	  I-­‐9609,	  para	  38.	  
89	  See	  López	  Guerra,	  National	  Identity	  and	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  in	  Saiz	  Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  
Llivina	   (eds),	  National	  Constitutional	   Identity	  and	  European	   Integration,	  2013,	  305	   (305	  et	   seq);	  also	  Brehms,	  
Human	  Rights:	  Universality	  and	  Diversity,	  2001,	  341	  et	  seq;	  Schokkenbroek,	  The	  Basis,	  Nature	  and	  Application	  
of	  the	  Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  Doctrine	  in	  the	  Case-­‐Law	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  Human	  Rights	  
Law	  Journal	  1998,	  30.	  
90	  ETS	  No	  3.	  
91	  See	   for	   instance	   Lindner,	   Grundrechtsschutz	   in	   Europa	   –	   System	   einer	   Kollisionsdogmatik,	   EuR	   2007,	   160	  
(168).	  
92	  Halberstam	  (supra	  note	  33)	  586;	  Halberstam,	  Federalism:	  A	  Critical	  Guide,	  Public	  Law	  and	  Legal	  Theory	  WP	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origin.	  Here,	  absolute	  primacy	  and	  the	  fundamental	  importance	  that	  the	  CJEU	  consistently	  attaches	  
to	  the	  free	  movement	  rights	  give	  rise	  to	  conflicts,	  some	  of	  them	  touching	  upon	  the	  core	  of	  national	  
constitutional	  identity.	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	  true	  the	  deeper	  European	  integration	  gets	  –	  especially	  in	  
the	   fundamental	   rights	   context.	   Potential	   recipes	   to	   solve	   these	   conflicts	   are	   laid	  down	   in	  Art	  4(2)	  
TEU	  and	  Art	  53	  CFREU,	  both	  of	  them	  being	  now	  subject	  to	  judicial	  review.	  
	  
One	   could	   take	   the	   view	   that	   in	   relation	   to	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU,	   which	   contains	   a	   general	   link	   to	   the	  
constitutional	   identities	  of	   the	  Member	   States,	  Art	   53	  CFREU	   constitutes	   a	   lex	   specialis	   specifically	  
applicable	  to	  fundamental	  rights.	  This	  cannot	  be	  followed;	  neither	  is	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  the	  
Günstigkeitsklausel	   limited	   to	   core	   fundamental	   rights	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Member	   States’	  
constitutions,	   nor	   is	   it	   linked	   to	   national	   identity.	   Admittedly,	   there	   is	   a	   presumption	   that	  
fundamental	   rights	   and	   their	   specific	   interpretation	   constitute	   part	   of	   national	   constitutional	  
identity;93	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  hold	  for	  all	  fundamental	  rights	  however.	  The	  intention	  of	  Art	  53	  
CFREU	   is	   to	  rule	  out	  a	  sort	  of	   race	  to	  the	  bottom	  in	   fundamental	   rights	  protection	  by	  undermining	  
higher	  standards	  already	  in	  place	  within	  the	  Member	  States.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  provision	  applies	  
in	   cases	  where	   different	   levels	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   protection	   are	   provided	   for	   –	   inter	   alia	   –	   by	  
domestic	   constitutions;94	  the	   identity	   clause	  on	   the	  contrary,	  applies	   in	   cases	  where	  EU	   law	  stands	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  a	  constitutionally	  guaranteed	  fundamental	  right	  and/or	  its	  specific	  interpretation	  forming	  an	  
expression	   of	   the	   very	   identity	   of	   a	   Member	   State.95	  Whereas	   the	   application	   of	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   is	  
triggered	  first	  and	  foremost	  by	  differences	  in	  the	  Member	  States’	  constitutional	  identities,	  for	  Art	  53	  
CFREU	  it	  is	  “only”	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  protection	  what	  counts	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  
absolutely	  irrelevant	  if	  other	  Member	  States	  provide	  for	  similar	  standards.	  
	  
There	   might	   be	   cases	   however,	   where	   a	   specific	   fundamental	   right	   constitutes	   an	   expression	   of	  
national	  constitutional	  identity	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  provides	  for	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  fundamental	  
rights	  protection;	  as	  there	  are	  obvious	  overlaps	  in	  the	  scopes	  of	  application	  of	  the	  two	  provisions,	  a	  
joint	  operation	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  and	  Art	  53	  CFREU	  is	  conceiveable.	  First,	  according	  to	  Art	  6(1)	  TEU,	  the	  
TEU	  and	  the	  Charter	  have	  the	  same	  legal	  status	  and	  there	  is	  no	  argument	  for	  a	  privileged	  status	  of	  
either	   provision;	   second,	   even	   though	   the	   political	   significance	   of	   the	   two	   provisions	  might	   differ	  
substantially,	   the	   subsequent	   section	  will	   show	   that	   the	   legal	   consequences	   flowing	   from	  Art	   4(2)	  
TEU	  are	  compatible	  with	  what	  the	  CJEU	  ruled	  with	  regard	  to	  Art	  53	  CFREU.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Similar	  Torres	  Pérez	  (supra	  note	  83)	  144	  with	  further	  references.	  
94	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  application	  of	  Art	  53	  CFREU,	  Sarmiento,	  Who	  is	  afraid	  of	  the	  Charter?	  
The	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   national	   Courts	   and	   the	   new	   Framework	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights	   Protection	   in	   Europe,	  
CMLRev	  2013,	  1267	  (1287	  et	  seq).	  
95	  See	   Opinion	   of	   AG	   Bot	   in	   Case	   C-­‐399/11,	   Stefano	   Melloni	   v	   Ministerio	   Fiscal,	   2.10.2012,	   nyr,	   para	   142,	  
according	   to	  whom	   “a	   concept	   demanding	  protection	   for	   fundamental	   rights	  must	   not	   be	   confused	  with	   an	  
attack	  on	  the	  (…)	  constitutional	  identity	  of	  a	  Member	  State”.	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IV.	  Identity	  clause	  –	  scope	  and	  legal	  consequences	  
	  
IV.1.	  Evolution	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  
	  
When	  the	  identity	  clause	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Treaties,	  then	  Art	  F	  TEU	  determined	  that	  “(t)he	  
Union	  shall	  respect	  the	  national	   identities	  of	   its	  Member	  States,	  whose	  systems	  of	  government	  are	  
based	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   democracy”.96	  Against	   the	   background	   of	   the	   accession	   of	   three	   new	  
States,	   whose	   democratic	   structures	   had	   been	   established	   only	   recently	   and	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Iron	  
Curtain,	   the	   link	   to	   the	   democratic	   systems	   of	   the	  Member	   States	   was	   understood	   as	   an	   implicit	  
precondition	   for	   accession.97	  With	   the	   subsequent	   Treaty	   revision	   in	   1997,	   the	   link	   to	   democratic	  
principles	  was	  dropped	  however.98	  A	  rephrased	  and	  more	  differentiated	  version	  of	  the	  provision	  was	  
later	  contained	  in	  the	  draft	  Treaty	  establishing	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe	  (TECE)99,	  which	  was	  –	  after	  
the	   failure	   of	   the	   TECE	   –	   maintained	   by	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon.	   Thus,	   the	   current	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	  
determines	  that	  	  
	  
“(t)he	  Union	  shall	  respect	  the	  equality	  of	  Member	  States	  before	  the	  Treaties	  as	  well	  as	  their	  national	  
identities,	  inherent	  in	  their	  fundamental	  structures,	  political	  and	  constitutional,	  inclusive	  of	  regional	  
and	  local	  self-­‐government	  (…)”.	  
	  
The	   reference	   to	   “fundamental	   structures,	   political	   and	   constitutional”	   constitutes	   a	   shift	   from	   a	  
predominantly	   cultural	   and	   linguistic	   to	   a	   constitutional	   understanding	  of	   identity,	   in	   line	  with	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  notion	  by	  national	  constitutional	  courts.100	  This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
duty	  to	  respect	  the	  cultural	  diversity	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  can	  be	  found	  at	  another	  occasion	  in	  the	  
Treaties,	  namely	  among	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Union	  set	  out	  in	  Art	  3(3)	  subpara	  4	  TEU.	  Constitutional	  
identity	   has	   therefore	   somehow	   emancipated	   from	   national	   identity. 101	  Regarding	   fundamental	  
structures	   and	   essential	   functions	   of	   the	   Member	   States,	   the	   Working	   Group	   of	   the	   European	  
Convention	   exemplarily	   related	   to	   questions	   of	   national	   citizenship,	   territory,	   the	   legal	   status	   of	  
churches	  and	  religious	  societies,	  national	  defense	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  armed	  forces	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
the	   choice	   of	   languages.	   According	   to	   the	   final	   report	   of	   this	  Working	  Group,	   the	   insertion	   of	   the	  
identity	  clause	  was	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  symbolic	  gesture	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  citizens	  and	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  guideline	  for	  the	  Union´s	  institutions	  when	  fulfilling	  their	  tasks.102	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  According	   to	   Ritleng,	   the	   ECJ	   implicitly	   respected	   the	   Member	   States´	   constitutional	   identities,	   when	   it	  
acknowledged	   unwritten	   general	   principles	   of	   law	   inspired	   by	   the	   common	   constitutional	   traditions	   of	   the	  
Member	  States;	  Ritleng,	  De	  l’utilité	  du	  principe	  de	  primauté	  du	  droit	  de	  l’Union,	  RTDE	  2009,	  677.	  
97	  See	  Claes,	  National	  Identity:	  Trump	  Card	  or	  Up	  for	  Negotiation?	  in	  Saiz	  Arnaiz/Alcoberro	  Llivina	  (supra	  note	  
10)	  109	  (116	  et	  seq).	  
98	  See	  Art	  6(3)	  TEU	  (Amsterdam	  version;	  consolidated	  text	  in	  OJ	  1997	  C	  340)	  and	  Art	  6(3)	  TEU	  (Nice	  version).	  
99	  Art	  I-­‐5	  TECE;	  OJ	  2004	  C	  310.	  
100	  Von	   Bogdandy/Schill,	   Die	   Achtung	   der	   nationalen	   Identität	   unter	   dem	   reformierten	   Unionsvertrag.	   Zur	  
unionsrechtlichen	   Rolle	   nationalen	   Verfassungsrechts	   und	   zur	   Überwindung	   des	   absoluten	   Vorrangs,	   ZaöRV	  
2010,	  701	  (711).	  AG	  Maduro	  is	  of	  the	  opinion,	  that	  when	  the	  versions	  of	  the	  provision	  prior	  to	  Lisbon	  referred	  
to	   “national	   identities”,	   this	   included	   constitutional	   identity;	   Opinion	   of	   AG	   Maduro	   in	   Case	   C-­‐213/07,	  
Michaniki,	  ECR	  2008,	  I-­‐9999,	  para	  31.	  
101	  Besselink	  (supra	  note	  65)	  44.	  
102	  Final	  report	  Working	  Group	  V	  (supra	  note	  81)	  11;	  the	  provision	  was	  named	  Christophersen	  clause,	  after	  the	  
chair	  of	  the	  working	  group;	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  on	  the	  travaux	  préparatoires,	  see	  Guastaferro	  (supra	  
note	  38)	  13	  et	  seq.	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A	   major	   difference	   between	   the	   TECE	   and	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   is	   that	   in	   the	   former	   Treaty,	   the	  
identity	   clause	   had	   to	   be	   read	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   supremacy	   clause.	   This	   may	   explain	   the	  
detachment	   of	   the	   constitutional	   from	   the	   cultural	   and	   linguistic	   identities	   in	   the	   TECE;	   the	  
determination	   that	   the	   Union	   has	   to	   respect	   the	   core	   constitutional	   provisions	   relevant	   for	   the	  
identity	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  may	  have	  allowed	  for	  the	  codification	  of	  primacy.	  As	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  
wording	  of	  Art	  I-­‐5	  TECE	  was	  maintained	  by	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  while	  Art	  I-­‐6	  TECE	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  
EU	   law	   was	   not.	   Is	   the	   identity	   clause	   now	   quoted	   out	   of	   context,	   as	   the	   primacy	   clause	   was	  
dropped?	  Or	   does	   the	   retention	   of	   the	   clause	   imply	   a	   possible	   relativization	   of	   absolute	   primacy?	  
This	  issue	  is	  to	  be	  addressed	  after	  having	  determined,	  who	  is	  competent	  to	  interpret	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU.	  
	  
IV.2.	  The	  question	  of	  interpretation	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Günstigkeitsklausel,	  which	  is	  obviously	  to	  be	  interpreted	  by	  the	  CJEU,	  it	  is	  far	  less	  
clear,	  who	   should	  have	   the	  ultimate	  authority	   to	  define	  what	   is	   covered	  by	   the	  notion	  of	  national	  
constitutional	  identity	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU.	  Even	  though	  it	  was	  the	  BVerfG	  who	  first	  used	  the	  
concept	  and	  even	  though	  the	  provision	  definitely	  requires	  an	  interpretation	  of	  national	  law,	  this	  does	  
not	  automatically	  imply	  that	  it	  is	  for	  the	  national	  courts	  to	  interpret	  it.	  By	  its	  codification,	  the	  concept	  
of	  constitutional	   identity	  has	  become	  a	  concept	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  its	   interpretation	  is	  therefore	  within	  
the	  sole	  competence	  of	  the	  CJEU;	  thus,	  when	  Art	  I-­‐5	  TECE	  was	  drafted	  by	  the	  European	  Convention,	  
it	  was	   the	   CJEU	  who	  was	   supposed	   to	   be	   the	   ultimate	   interpreter	   of	   the	   provision.103	  This	   view	   is	  
supported	  by	  Art	  19	  TEU,	  which	  sets	  forth	  that	  it	  is	  for	  the	  CJEU	  to	  ensure	  “that	  in	  the	  interpretation	  
and	  application	  of	  the	  Treaties	  the	  law	  is	  observed”;	  furthermore,	  it	  is	  only	  for	  the	  CJEU	  to	  interpret	  
the	   Treaties	   and	   to	   assess	   the	   validity	   and	   interpretation	   of	   secondary	   legislation	   by	   means	   of	  
preliminary	  rulings.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  ensuring	  uniform	  application	  of	  EU	  law	  it	  is	  therefore	  obligatory	  for	  
national	  courts,	  at	  least	  for	  those	  against	  whose	  decisions	  there	  is	  no	  judicial	  remedy	  under	  domestic	  
law,	  to	  refer	  questions	  regarding	  the	  interpretation	  EU	  law	  –	  including	  that	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  –	  to	  the	  
CJEU.	  On	   the	   other	   hand	   it	   does	   certainly	   not	   live	   up	   to	   the	   objective	   of	   provision	   if	   there	  was	   a	  
central	   and	   standardized	   interpretation	   by	   a	   supranational	   Court	   of	   what	   should	   be	   regarded	  
constitutive	  for	  28	  individual	  national	  constitutional	  identities.	  
	  
It	  seems	  that	  here	  the	  BVerfG	  in	  its	  Lisbon	  decision	  found	  an	  acceptable	  middle	  ground,	  when	  it	  took	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  demarcate	  the	  competences	  to	  interpret	  constitutional	  identity	  between	  the	  CJEU	  
and	   national	   courts,	   even	   before	   the	   CJEU	   had	   a	   possibility	   to	   do	   so.	   It	   obviously	   understands	  
constitutional	   identity	  as	  a	  national	  constitutional	  concept	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  where	   the	  exercise	  of	  
the	  review	  power	  is	  rooted	  in	  domestic	  constitutional	   law	  and	  as	  a	  concept	  of	  EU	  law	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  whose	   interpretation	  remains	  within	   the	  sole	  competence	  of	   the	  CJEU.	   It	   thereby	   leaves	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   to	   the	   CJEU	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   reserves	   the	   interpretation	   of	  
constitutional	  identity	  as	  a	  national	  constitutional	  concept	  to	  itself	  and	  thus	  to	  national	  constitutional	  
courts	  in	  general.	  The	  reasoning	  is	  simple;	  what	  cannot	  be	  conferred	  to	  the	  Union	  can	  in	  no	  case	  be	  
subject	   to	   interpretation	   by	   the	   CJEU.	   Unlike	   other	   constitutional	   courts,	   it	   clearly	   indicates	   what	  
constitutes	   the	   “inviolable	   core	   content	   of	   the	   constitutional	   identity”	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Germany	   by	  
referring	   to	   the	   so	   called	   “eternity	   clause”104,	   which	   is	   clearly	   “not	   open	   to	   integration”.105	  By	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Final	  report	  of	  Working	  Group	  V	  (supra	  note	  81)	  11.	  
104	  Art	  79(3)	  GG.	  
105	  BVerfG	   2	   BvE	   2/08,	   30.6.2009,	   Lisbon,	   paras	   239	   et	   seq	   (English).	   For	   the	   vague	   jurisprudence	   of	   other	  
constitutional	  courts	  on	  national	  identity,	  see	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1435	  et	  seq.	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emphasizing	   that	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   review	   power	   will	   be	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  
Europarechtsfreundlichkeit	   (the	  openness	   towards	  EU	   law)	  of	   the	  Grundgesetz,	   and	  by	   stating	   that	  
the	  two	  concepts	  of	  constitutional	  identity	  should	  “go	  hand	  in	  hand	  in	  the	  European	  legal	  area”,	  the	  
BVerfG	  implicitly	  invites	  the	  CJEU	  to	  cooperate.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  BVerfG	  limits	  the	  national	  concept	  
of	  constitutional	   identity	  to	   its	   inviolable	  core	  content	  as	  protected	  by	  the	  eternity	  clause	  could	  be	  
understood	  –	  at	  least	  at	  the	  first	  sight	  –	  as	  a	  restrictive	  interpretation,	  per	  se	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  
of	  openness	  towards	  EU	  law;	  the	  subsequent	  broad	  understanding	  of	  what	  this	  core	  content	  entails,	  
conveys	   a	   different	   impression	   however	   and	   has	   rightly	   been	   subject	   to	   criticism	   in	   the	   legal	  
literature.	   Von	   Bogdandy/Schill	   for	   instance	   state	   that	   “(i)t	   is	   not	   convincing	   (…)	   to	   understand	  
national	   identity	   as	   an	   absolute	   barrier	   and	   to	   interpret	   it	   as	   broadly”	   as	   the	   BVerfG	   indicated	   in	  
Lisbon.106	  
	  
Whereas	   the	   current	   case	   law	   on	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   reveals	   a	   tendency	   of	   the	   Member	   States	   to	  
inflationary	   invoke	   constitutional	   identity,	   an	   expedient	   understanding	   of	   the	   provision	   obviously	  
requires	   a	   “less	   is	   more”	   approach.	   This	   comes	   clear	   from	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   provision	   that	   is	  
establishing	   a	   link	   to	   constitutional	   aspects	   of	   identity;	   it	   is	   typically	   referred	   to	   constitutions	   as	  
sources	   of	   legal	   norms	   determining	   the	   most	   fundamental	   rules	   underlying	   a	   specific	   legal	  
arrangement,	   like	   for	   example	   the	   form	   of	   government,	   the	   official	   language	   or	   the	   specific	  
interpretation	   of	   certain	   fundamental	   rights.	   While	   the	   specification	   of	   those	   fundamental	  
democratic	   choices	   of	   a	   constituency,	   be	   it	   judicially	   or	   legislatively,	   should	   be	   covered	   by	   the	  
identity	  clause,	  in	  substantive	  terms	  its	  application	  should	  be	  limited	  to	  a	  constitutional	  core.	  At	  this	  
point,	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  have	  a	  cursory	  and	  comparative	  view	  on	  two	  occasions,	  where	  the	  CJEU	  strived	  
to	   protect	   the	   essence	   of	   fundamental	   provisions	   of	   EU	   law.	   First,	   there	   is	   the	   essential	   elements	  
doctrine	   developed	   in	   the	   citizenship	   context.	  When	   the	   CJEU	   determines	   that	   “citizenship	   of	   the	  
Union	   is	   intended	   to	   be	   the	   fundamental	   status	   of	   nationals	   of	   the	   Member	   States”,	   it	   should	  
likewise	   concede	   that	   national	   constitutional	   identity	   is	   fundamental	   for	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	  
individuality	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Member	  States;	  while	  Art	  20	  TFEU	  “precludes	  national	  measures	  
which	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  depriving	  citizens	  of	  the	  Union	  of	  the	  genuine	  enjoyment	  of	  the	  substance	  
of	   the	   rights	   conferred	   by	   virtue	   of	   their	   status	   as	   citizens	   of	   the	   Union”,	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   should	   be	  
understood	  as	  precluding	  Union	  measures	  which	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  depriving	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  
their	   citizens	   of	   the	   genuine	   enjoyment	   of	   the	   substance	   of	   rights	   that	   are	   constitutive	   for	   their	  
constitutional	   identity.107	  Second,	   in	  a	   recent	   judgment	   the	  CJEU	  has	  applied	   its	  essential	  elements	  
doctrine	   to	   fundamental	   rights,	  when	   it	  held	   that	   “any	   limitation	  on	   the	  exercise	  of	   the	   rights	  and	  
freedoms	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Charter	  must	  be	  provided	  for	  by	  law,	  respect	  their	  essence	  and,	  subject	  to	  
the	  principle	  of	  proportionality,	   limitations	  may	  be	  made	  to	  those	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  only	   if	   they	  
are	  necessary	  and	  genuinely	  meet	  objectives	  of	  general	  interest	  recognized	  by	  the	  Union	  or	  the	  need	  
to	  protect	   the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  others”.108	  A	  similar	  understanding	  would	  be	  advisable	  when	  
interpreting	  the	  EU	  concept	  of	  national	  constitutional	  identity.	  
	  
Thus,	  what	  national	  courts	  should	  claim	  for	  as	  being	  protected	  under	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU,	  should	  be	  limited	  
to	   the	  most	   essential	   elements	   of	   constitutional	   identity109	  	   and	   this	   constitutional	   core	   should	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	   (supra	  note	  9)	  1446.	  The	  Lisbon	  decision	  was	   later	  relativized	   in	  Honeywell,	  BVerfG	  2	  
BvR	  2661/06,	  6.7.2010,	  Honeywell.	  
107	  Case	  C-­‐34/09,	  Gerardo	  Ruiz	  Zambrano	  v	  Office	  national	  de	  l’emploi,	  ECR	  2011,	  I-­‐1177,	  para	  41.	  
108	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐293/12	  and	  C-­‐594/12,	  Digital	  Rights	  Ireland	  et	  al,	  nyr,	  para	  38.	  
109	  Similar	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1435	  et	  seq.	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taken	   all	   the	   more	   serious	   by	   the	   Union.	   Against	   the	   background	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   sincere	  
cooperation,	  national	  as	  well	  as	  European	  courts	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  issue	  and	  
of	  the	  potential	  benefits	  and	  risks	  this	  provision	  brings	  about	  for	  European	   integration.	  Then	  –	  and	  
only	  then	  –	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  the	  identity	  clause	  can	  be	  realized	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  strengthens	  
the	  Unions	   legitimacy	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   allows	   the	  Member	   States	   to	   preserve	   their	   national	  
identities.	  
	  
IV.3.	  Case	  law	  of	  the	  CJEU	  
	  
Since	  the	  identity	  clause	  has	  become	  judicially	  enforceable	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2009,	  constitutional	  identity	  
was	   invoked	   at	   several	   occasions	   before	   the	   CJEU. 110	  The	   first	   case	   was	   Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein,	   a	  
preliminary	  reference	   initiated	  by	  the	  Austrian	  Verwaltungsgerichtshof	  concerning	  Art	  21	  TFEU	  and	  
the	  non-­‐recognition	  of	  a	  nobility	   title	  acquired	   in	  Germany.111	  The	  Austrian	  Law	  on	  abolition	  of	   the	  
nobility,	  which	  has	   constitutional	   status,	   constitutes	   an	   implementation	  of	   the	   general	   principle	  of	  
equal	   treatment	   and	   prohibits	   the	   acquisition,	   possession	   or	   use	   by	   its	   citizens	   of	   noble	   titles	   or	  
status.112	  According	   to	   the	  Austrian	  Government,	   this	   rule	   is	   intended	   to	  protect	   the	   constitutional	  
identity	  of	  the	  Republic;	  being	  a	   fundamental	  decision	   in	   favor	  of	   formal	  equality,	  an	  expression	  of	  
the	  history	  of	  Austria	  as	  an	  empire	  and	   its	   fundamental	  values,	  any	   restriction	  on	   the	   right	   to	   free	  
movement	  would	  be	  justified.113	  First	  the	  Court	  determined	  that	  the	  Austrian	  measure	  constitutes	  a	  
restriction	  on	  the	  freedoms	  conferred	  by	  Art	  21	  TFEU.114	  While	  AG	  Sharpston	  did	  not	  even	  mention	  
national	   identity,115	  the	   ECJ	   finally	   referred	   to	   Art	   4(2)	   TEU	   when	   examining	   possible	   grounds	   for	  
justification.	   It	  determined,	   in	   line	  with	   the	  observations	   submitted	  by	   the	  Commission,116	  that	   the	  
status	  of	  a	  State	  as	  a	  Republic	  belongs	  to	  its	  national	  identity	  that	  as	  such	  has	  to	  be	  respected	  by	  the	  
Union.117	  
	  
The	   judgment	   suggests	   that	   the	   CJEU	   is	   not	   willing	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   substantive	   discussion	   on	   the	  
identity	  clause;	   there	   is	  no	  further	  argument	  on	  the	  applicability	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU.	   It	  
seems	  that	  the	  Court	  is	  not	  willing	  to	  attach	  as	  much	  importance	  to	  constitutional	  identity	  as	  it	  was	  
expected	   to	   do	   by	   clearly	   subordinating	   it	   to	   free	  movement,	   which	   –	   as	   is	   well	   known	   –	   enjoys	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  For	  reasons	  of	  space	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  Court´s	  case	  law	  is	  omitted	  here	  and	  the	  focus	  is	  placed	  
on	  post-­‐Lisbon	  cases;	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  law	  see	  Burgorgue-­‐Larsen,	  Un	  Huron	  au	  Plateau	  
de	   Kirchberg	   ou	   quelques	   réflexions	   naïves	   sur	   l’identité	   constitutionnelle	   dans	   la	   jurisprudence	   du	   juge	   de	  
l’Union	   européenne,	   in	   Levrat/Besson	   (eds),	   (Dés)ordres	   juridiques	   européens	  –	   European	   Legal	   (Dis)orders,	  
2012,	  185.	  
111	  Besselink,	  Case	  C-­‐208/09,	   Ilonka	  Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein	  v.	  Landeshauptmann	  von	  Wien,	   Judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  
(Second	   Chamber)	   of	   22	   December	   2010,	   nyr,	   CMLRev	   2012,	   671;	   Di	   Salvatore,	   Il	   Caso	   Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein:	  
ordine	  pubblico	  e	   identità	   costituzionale	  dello	   Stato	  membro,	  Quaderni	   costituzionali	   2011,	  435;	   Jastrzebska	  
Beata,	   Le	   principe	   de	   l’identité	   nationale	   des	   États	   membres	   –	   signification	   incertaine	   d’une	   disposition	  
ambiteuse,	  in	  Besson/Pichonnaz	  (eds),	  Les	  principes	  en	  droit	  européen.	  Principles	  in	  European	  Law,	  2011,	  163	  
(176	   et	   seq);	   Kröll,	   Der	   EuGH	   als	   “Hüter”	   des	   republikanischen	   Grundprinzips	   der	   österreichischen	  
Bundesverfassung?	  Anmerkungen	  zum	  Urteil	  des	  EuGH	  vom	  22.	  Dezember	  2010	  in	  der	  Rs.	  Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein,	  
in	  Jahrbuch	  Öffentliches	  Recht	  2011,	  313;	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1423	  et	  seq. 
112	  Case	  C-­‐208/09,	  Ilonka	  Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein	  v	  Landeshauptmann	  von	  Wien,	  ECR	  2010,	  I-­‐13693,	  para	  88.	  
113	  Case	  C-­‐208/09,	  Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein,	  ECR	  2010,	  I-­‐13693,	  paras	  74	  et	  seq.	  
114	  Case	  C-­‐208/09,	  Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein,	  ECR	  2010,	  I-­‐13693,	  para	  71.	  
115	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Sharpston	  in	  Case	  C-­‐208/09,	  Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein,	  ECR	  2010,	  I-­‐13693.	  
116	  Case	  C-­‐208/09,	  Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein,	  ECR	  2010,	  I-­‐13693,	  para	  80.	  
117	  Case	  C-­‐208/09,	  Sayn-­‐Wittgenstein,	  ECR	  2010,	  I-­‐13693,	  para	  92.	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fundamental	   status	   in	   EU	   law118.	   It	   is	   rather	  en	  passant,	  while	   assessing	   the	  proportionality	   of	   the	  
measure	   justified	  on	  grounds	  of	  public	  policy,	  when	  the	  Court	  cursorily	  mentions	   it.	  Thus,	  unlike	   in	  
earlier	   judgments,	   where	   the	   CJEU	   stated	   that	   “the	   preservation	   of	   the	  Member	   States'	   national	  
identities	   is	   a	   legitimate	   aim	   respected	   by	   the	   Community	   legal	   order”119,	   in	   the	   present	   case	   the	  
Court	  does	  not	  explicitly	  regard	  the	  identity	  clause	  as	  a	  possible	  ground	  for	  justification	  comparable	  
to	  what	  it	  accepted	  for	  fundamental	  rights.120	  Here	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  Court	  merely	  refers	  to	  national	  
identity	   as	   an	   additional	   criterion	   for	   assessing	   the	   proportionality	   of	   the	   Austrian	   measure.	   It	  
becomes	  clear	  however	   that	   the	  constitutional	  organization	  of	  a	  State	   falls	  within	   the	  scope	  of	  Art	  
4(2)	   TEU.121	  It	   remains	   open	   though,	   whether	   the	   identity	   clause	   is	   applicable	   due	   to	   the	   special	  
interpretation	  by	   the	  Austrian	  Constitution,	   following	   from	   the	  State’s	  history	  as	  an	  empire	  or	   if	   it	  
generally	   applies	   to	   the	  different	   constitutional	   arrangements	  provided	   for	  by	   the	  Member	   States.	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  republican	  form	  of	  government	  constitutes	  a	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  identity	  of	  a	  
State	   in	   itself	  confirms	  the	  argument	  that	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	   is	   triggered	  also	  by	  constitutional	  principles	  
that	  are	  shared	  with	  other	  Member	  States	  and	  their	  specific	  interpretation	  in	  the	  particular	  Member	  
State.122	  	  
	  
In	   two	  other	   free	  movement	  cases	  concerning	   linguistic	  diversity,	  Runevič-­‐Vardyn123	  and	  Las124,	   the	  
CJEU	   –	   again	   when	   examining	   a	   possible	   justification	   –	   determined	   that	   the	   respect	   for	   national	  
identity	  claimed	  by	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  includes	  the	  protection	  of	  a	  State’s	  official	  national	  language,	  by	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  referring	  to	  Art	  3(3)	  TEU	  and	  Art	  22	  CFREU.125	  Recently	  the	  CJEU	  was	  concerned	  with	  a	  
case	   concerning	   the	   access	   to	   the	   profession	   of	   a	   lawyer,	   more	   specifically	   with	   the	   question,	  
whether	  or	  not	  a	  provision	  of	  secondary	  EU	  law	  should	  be	  held	  invalid	  due	  to	  its	  incompatibility	  with	  
a	   constitutional	   provision	   under	  which	   access	   to	   that	   profession	   is	   dependent	   on	   having	   passed	   a	  
State	   examination.	   The	   directive	   at	   issue	   implements	   the	   right	   to	   establishment	   for	   lawyers,126	  
allowing	   them	   to	   practice	   in	   other	   Member	   States	   under	   the	   professional	   title	   obtained	   in	   the	  
Member	  State	  of	  origin.	  After	  determining	  that	  the	  directive	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  circumvention	  of	  
the	  constitutional	  rule,	  the	  CJEU	  concludes	  that	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  directive	  “in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  enables	  
nationals	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  who	  obtain	  the	  professional	  title	  of	  lawyer	  in	  another	  Member	  State	  to	  
practice	  the	  profession	  of	  lawyer	  in	  the	  State	  of	  which	  they	  are	  nationals	  under	  the	  professional	  title	  
obtained	  in	  the	  home	  Member	  State,	  is	  not,	  in	  any	  event,	  capable	  of	  affecting	  either	  the	  fundamental	  
political	  and	  constitutional	  structures	  or	  the	  essential	  functions	  of	  the	  host	  Member	  State	  within	  the	  
meaning	  of	  Article	  4(2)	  TEU”.127	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  For	   instance	  Case	  C-­‐51/08,	  Commission	   v	   Luxemburg,	   ECR	  2011,	   I-­‐4231,	   paras	   77	  et	   seq,	  where	   the	  CJEU	  
qualified	   the	   freedom	   of	   establishment	   as	   one	   of	   the	   fundamental	   provisions	   of	   EU	   law	   that	   has	   to	   be	  
interpreted	  broadly.	  
119	  Case	  C-­‐473/93,	  Commission	  v	  Luxemburg,	  ECR	  1996,	  I-­‐3207,	  para	  35.	  
120	  Cf	  Case	  C-­‐36/02,	  Omega,	  ECR	  2004,	  I-­‐9609,	  para	  35.	  
121	  In	  this	  context	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1424	  et	  seq.	  
122	  Supra	  III.	  
123 	  Case	   C-­‐391/09,	   Malgožata	   Runevič-­‐Vardyn	   and	   Łukasz	   Paweł	   Wardyn	   v	   Vilniaus	   miesto	   savivaldybės	  
administracija	  and	  others,	  ECR	  2011,	  I-­‐3787,	  para	  86;	   in	  this	  regard	  see	  the	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Maduro	   in	  Case	  C-­‐
160/03,	  Spain	  v	  Eurojust,	  ECR	  2005,	  I-­‐2077,	  para	  35.	  
124	  Case	  C-­‐202/11,	  Anton	  Las	  v	  PSA	  Antwerp	  NV,	  16.4.2013,	  nyr,	  para	  26.	  
125	  See	  also	  Case	  C-­‐51/08,	  European	  Commission	  v	  Grand	  Duchy	  of	  Luxemburg,	  ECR	  2011,	  I-­‐4231,	  para	  124.	  
126	  Directive	  98/5/EC	  to	  facilitate	  practice	  of	  the	  profession	  of	  lawyer	  on	  a	  permanent	  basis	  in	  a	  Member	  State	  
other	  than	  that	  in	  which	  the	  qualification	  was	  obtained,	  OJ	  1998	  L	  77/36.	  
127	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐58/13	  and	  C-­‐59/13,	  Angelo	  Alberto	  Torresi	  and	  Pierfrancesco	  Torresi	  v	  Consiglio	  dell’Ordine	  
degli	  Avvocati	  di	  Macerata,	  17.7.2014,	  nyr,	  paras	  53	  et	  seq.	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It	  is	  striking	  that	  the	  Court	  first	  examines,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  directive	  allows	  for	  a	  
circumvention	  of	  the	  respective	  constitutional	  provision,	  and	  only	   in	  a	  second	  step	  determines	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  capability	  of	  that	  provision	  to	  affect	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU.	  The	  access	  to	  a	  profession,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  
constitutionally	  determined,	  is	  under	  no	  circumstances	  constitutive	  for	  the	  constitutional	  identity	  of	  
a	  State.	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	  true,	  as	  a	  lawyer	  typically	  does	  not	  exercise	  any	  sort	  of	  public	  authority.	  
Welcomingly,	   in	   O´Brian,	   the	   CJEU	   comes	   more	   straight	   to	   the	   point.	   In	   response	   to	   the	   Latvian	  
government,	   according	   to	  which	   the	   application	   of	   EU	   law	   to	   the	   judiciary,	  more	   precisely	   on	   the	  
remuneration	  of	  part-­‐time	  judges,	  would	  as	  such	  be	  contrary	  to	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU,	  the	  Court	  simply	  held	  
that	  this	  “cannot	  have	  any	  effect	  on	  national	  identity”.128	  
	  
IV.4.	  Constitutional	  identity	  and	  the	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  
	  
Since	   the	   BVerfG	   first	   referred	   to	   national	   identity	   in	   the	   fundamental	   rights	   context	   in	   1974,	  
fundamental	  rights	  have	  been	  consistently	  accepted	  as	  a	  constitutive	  part	  of	  national	  constitutional	  
identity.129	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  CJEU	  has	  held	  that	  different	  standards	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  protection	  
do	   as	   such	   not	   preclude	   the	   proportionality	   of	   a	   national	   provision	   intended	   to	   ensure	   a	   specific	  
standard	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   protection. 130 	  Even	   though	   the	   Court	   has	   given	   priority	   to	  
fundamental	   rights	   at	   several	   occasions,	   their	   applicability	   is	   likewise	   examined	   “only”	   within	   the	  
context	  of	  a	  possible	   justification	  and	  the	  proportionality	  of	  the	  measure	  at	   issue	  and	  not	  on	  equal	  
footing	  with	  the	  fundamental	  market	  freedoms.	  
	  
When	  in	  Melloni	  the	  CJEU	  had	  the	  first	  opportunity	  to	  interpret	  the	  Günstigkeitsklausel	  of	  the	  CFREU,	  
which	  has	  been	  subject	  to	  judicial	  review	  since	  the	  entering	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  only,	  
the	   Court	   gave	   a	   clear	   rebuff	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   possible	   neutralization	   of	   the	   primacy	   doctrine	   as	  
discussed	  in	  the	  legal	  literature.131	  The	  referring	  court	  envisaged	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Art	  53	  CFREU	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  Member	  States,	  whose	  constitutions	  provide	  for	  a	  higher	  standard	  than	  that	  provided	  
for	  by	  the	  Charter	  are	  generally	  authorized	  to	  apply	  their	  standards;	  this	  interpretation,	  according	  to	  
the	  Court,	  would	  undermine	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  cannot	  be	  accepted.	  Thus,	  Art	  53	  
CFREU	  allows	  for	  the	  application	  of	  higher	  fundamental	  rights	  standards	  only	   if	  „the	  primacy,	  unity	  
and	  effectiveness	  of	  EU	  law	  are	  not	  thereby	  compromised“.132	  By	  generally	  placing	  the	  necessity	  to	  
preserve	  the	  effet	  utile	  of	  EU	  law	  above	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  to	  preserve	  their	  specific	  
interpretations	   of	   certain	   fundamental	   rights,	   the	   Court	  makes	   clear	   that	   it	   not	  willing	   to	   ease	   its	  
strict	  policy	  in	  terms	  of	  absolute	  primacy;	  this	  is	  all	  the	  more	  significant,	  as	  with	  fundamental	  rights	  
an	  area	  is	  concerned	  that	  has	  been	  widely	  accepted	  as	  being	  at	  the	  core	  of	  national	  (constitutional)	  
identity.133	  Melloni,	  a	  case	  not	  concerned	  with	  constitutional	  identity,	  comes	  as	  no	  surprise	  however;	  
allowing	  for	  limitations	  to	  absolute	  primacy	  in	  one	  case,	  would	  open	  Pandora’s	  box.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  Court	  
would	  have	  allowed	   for	  domestic	   fundamental	   rights	   to	  exempt	  primacy,	   then	   this	  must	  have	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Case	  C-­‐393/10,	  Dermod	  Patrick	  O’Brien	  v	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  1.3.2012,	  nyr,	  para	  49.	  
129	  Besselink	  (supra	  note	  111)	  684.	  
130	  Case	  C-­‐36/02,	  Omega,	  ECR	  2004,	  I-­‐9609,	  para	  38.	  
131	  In	  this	  regard	  cf	  Sarmiento	  (supra	  note	  94)	  with	  further	  references	  in	  fn	  89;	  also	  Besselink,	  Entrapped	  by	  the	  
Maximum	  Standard:	  On	  Fundamental	  Rights,	  Pluralism	  and	  Subsidiarity	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  CMLRev	  1998,	  
629	  et	  seq.	  
132	  Case	  C-­‐399/11,	  Melloni,	  26.2.2013,	  nyr,	  paras	  56	  et	  seq.	  
133	  See	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  BVerfG	  in	  Solange	  I	  (BVerfG	  37,	  271,	  29.5.1974)	  and	  the	  Schmidberger	  case	  law,	  Case	  
C-­‐112/09,	  Schmidberger,	  ECR	  2003,	  I-­‐5659;	  also	  Case	  C-­‐36/02,	  Omega,	  ECR	  2004,	  I-­‐9609.	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applied	   to	   all	   other	   sources	   referred	   to	   in	   Art	   53	   CFREU,	   such	   as	   human	   rights	   recognized	   in	  
international	  agreements	  concluded	  by	  the	  Union	  or	  the	  Member	  States.	  
	  
Even	   though	   after	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Treaty,	   the	   supremacy	   clause	   was	   dropped,	  
primacy	  still	  constitutes	  an	  unwritten	  structural	  element	  of	  EU	  law,	  at	  least	  fortified	  by	  a	  legally	  non-­‐
binding	  declaration	  attached	  to	  the	  Treaties.134	  According	  to	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill,	  the	  identity	  clause	  
should	  be	  understood	  as	  enabling	  national	  constitutional	  courts	  in	  exceptional	  cases	  to	  invoke	  limits	  
to	  the	  principle	  of	  primacy.135	  Besselink´s	  argument	  goes	  in	  the	  same	  direction,	  stating	  that	  identity-­‐
related	  exceptions	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  EU	  law	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	  constitutional	  provisions	  that	  are	  
fundamental	   and	   contributing	   to	   the	   very	   identity	   of	   a	  Member	   State´s	   constitution.136	  And	   so	   do	  
Kumm/Ferreres	  Comella	  who,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  identity	  clause	  of	  the	  TECE	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  
the	   primacy	   clause,	   held	   that	   the	   national	   courts	   should	   be	   authorized	   qua	   EU	   law	   to	   set	   aside	  
secondary	  EU	  law	  in	  certain	  cases	  concerned	  with	  national	  constitutional	  identity.	  According	  to	  their	  
proposal,	   the	  capacity	  of	  Member	  States´	   courts	   to	  affect	  uniform	  application	  of	  EU	   law	  should	  be	  
limited	   to	   cases,	   where	   they	   can	   claim	   that	   a	   specific	   legal	   rule	   “explicitly	   incorporated”	   in	   the	  
national	   constitution	   justifies	   non-­‐compliance	  with	   EU	   law.137	  Claes	   on	   the	   contrary	   states	   that	  Art	  
4(2)	  TEU	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  limitation	  to	  primacy,	  but	  rather	  as	  imposing	  an	  obligation	  on	  
the	   Union	   to	   provide	   for	   exceptions	   to	   the	   uniform	   application	   and	   thus	   to	   engage	   with	   those	  
Member	  States	  who	  claim	  that	  their	  national	  identities	  are	  at	  stake.138	  
	  
The	  current	  case	  law	  on	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  does	  not	  reveal	  any	  intentions	  of	  the	  CJEU	  to	  relativize	  its	  strict	  
policy	  on	  absolute	  primacy.	  By	  sticking	  to	  its	  previous	  case	  law,	  national	  identity	  is	  at	  best	  considered	  
as	  a	  possible	  derogation	  from	  free	  movement	  subject	  to	  a	  proportionality	  test	  where	  the	  interest	  to	  
preserve	   national	   constitutional	   identity	   is	   balanced	   against	   a	   specific	   provision	   of	   EU	   law.139	  Even	  
though	   the	   approach	   of	   the	   Court	   seems	   to	   go	   in	   the	   right	   direction,	   by	   simply	   “downgrading”	  
national	   constitutional	   identity	   to	   a	   mere	   supporting	   argument	   that	   is	   swiftly	   mentioned	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  the	  proportionality	  test,	  it	  surely	  misses	  the	  point.140	  What	  is	  required	  is	  no	  automatism	  of	  
whatever	  kind,	  but	  rather	  a	  substantial	  discussion	  of	  identity	  relevant	  issues.	  In	  cases	  where	  EU	  law	  
unduly	   encroaches	   on	   national	   constitutional	   identity,	   the	   consequence	   should	   –	   in	   line	   with	   the	  
principle	   of	   proportionality	   –	   not	   go	   beyond	  what	   is	   necessary	   in	   ordert	   o	   attain	   the	   objective	   of	  
preserving	  different	  national	  identities	  of	  the	  Member	  States.141	  Therefore,	  the	  identity	  clause	  must	  
not	  be	  understood	  as	  “overcoming	  absolute	  primacy”142,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  derogation	  from	  primacy.143	  
Adherence	   to	   the	   primacy	   doctrine	   further	   corresponds	   to	   the	   CJEU´s	   ruling	   on	   the	   legal	  
consequences	   of	   Art	   53	   CFREU	   in	   Melloni.	   Whereas	   there	   is	   nothing	   to	   argue	   against	   a	   joint	  
operation	   of	   the	   two	   provisions,	   Art	   53	   CFREU	   applies	   to	   individual	  Member	   States’	   standards	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  Declaration	  No	  17,	  OJ	  2012	  C	  326/346.	  
135	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1419.	  
136	  Besselink	  (supra	  note	  101)	  47	  et	  seq.	  
137	  Kumm/Ferreres	  Comella	  (supra	  note	  4)	  6.	  
138	  Claes	  (supra	  note	  97)	  112,	  accentuation	  by	  the	  author;	  similar	  Torres	  Pérez	  (supra	  note	  83)	  146	  et	  seq.	  
139	  Art	  I-­‐5	  TECE	  was	  intended	  to	  “safeguard	  the	  role	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  Member	  States”	  within	  the	  Treaties	  
while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  allowing	  for	  a	  margin	  of	  flexibility;	  the	  Member	  States	  were	  meant	  to	  remain	  under	  a	  
duty	  to	  respect	  the	  Treaties;	  see	  final	  report	  of	  Working	  Group	  V	  (supra	  note	  81)	  11.	  
140	  Similar	  Besselink	  (supra	  note	  111)	  684.	  
141	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  justification	  of	  restrictions	  to	  market	  freedoms	  see	  for	   instance	  Case	  C-­‐137/09,	  Marc	  
Michel	  Josemans	  v	  Burgemeester	  van	  Maastricht,	  ECR	  2010,	  I-­‐13019,	  para	  69	  with	  further	  references.	  
142	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9).	  
143	  Similar	  Claes	  (supra	  note	  97)	  112;	  Torres	  Pérez	  (supra	  note	  83)	  146	  et	  seq.	  
	   29	  
fundamental	   rights	   protection	   that	   are	   (in	   most	   cases)	   not	   connected	   to	   national	   constitutional	  
identity.	  The	   identity	  clause	  on	  the	  other	  hand	   is	  applicable	  where	   the	  protection	  of	  constitutional	  
idenitity	   is	   invoked	   and	   therefore	   relevant	   for	   politically	   sensitive	   legal	   issues.	   Given	   the	   fact	   that	  
neither	   European	   nor	   national	   courts	   are	   on	   their	   own	   competent	   to	   give	   an	   authoritative	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  national	  and	  the	  European	  concepts	  of	  constitutional	  identity	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
it	  is	  judicial	  cooperation	  that	  is	  proposed	  here.	  
	  
V.	  Conclusion:	  a	  Constitutional	  Committee	  for	  the	  European	  Union	  
	  
What	   most	   authors	   share	   is	   that	   an	   intensified	   judicial	   dialogue	   between	   European	   and	   national	  
courts	   is	   crucial	   for	   a	   serious	   balancing	   of	   national	   and	   Union	   interests.	   Accordingly,	   Von	  
Bogdandy/Schill	  propose	  sort	  of	  a	  “reverse	  preliminary	  ruling”,	  where	  the	  CJEU	  is	  meant	  to	  request	  
information	  on	   the	   view	  of	   the	   constitutional	   court	   of	   the	   respective	  Member	   State	   regarding	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   national	   constitutional	   identity	   in	   a	   specific	   case.	   Based	   on	   the	   information	   it	  
receives,	   the	   CJEU	   should	   balance	   the	   Member	   States’	   and	   the	   Union´s	   interests	   by	   taking	   due	  
account	   of	   the	   view	   expressed	   by	   the	   State	   via	   its	   constitutional	   court.	   While	   according	   to	   Von	  
Bogdandy/Schill,	  the	  final	  decision	  would	  be	  left	  with	  the	  CJEU,	  national	  constitutional	  courts	  would	  
have	   the	   possibility	   to	   carry	   out	   an	   identity	   control	   test	   themselves;	   under	   the	   assumption	   that	  
national	   constitutional	   courts	   respect	   the	   principle	   of	   sincere	   cooperation,	   remaining	   divergences	  
would	   have	   to	   be	   accepted	   in	   a	   pluralistic	   legal	   environment. 144 	  Under	   the	   proposal	   of	  
Kumm/Ferreres	  Comella,	   it	  should	  be	  for	  the	  constitutional	   legislator	  and	  not	   for	  the	  constitutional	  
courts	   to	   override	   EU	   law,	   provided	   the	   national	   law	   at	   issue	   is	   specific	   in	   nature	   and	   not	   just	   an	  
abstract	   right.	   Their	   intention	   is	   to	   reduce	   the	   risk	   for	   the	   uniform	   enforcement	   of	   EU	   law	   by	  
establishing	  the	  specificity	  requirement.145	  
	  
The	   solution	   proposed	   here	   goes	   in	   a	   slightly	   different	   direction.	   Conforming	   with	   the	   prevailing	  
opinion	   in	   the	   legal	   literature,	   a	   qualified	   European-­‐wide	   discourse	   on	   the	   issue	   is	   certainly	  
needed;146	  what	  would	  be	  counterproductive	  however,	  is	  a	  neutralization	  of	  the	  primacy	  doctrine	  on	  
the	   one	   hand	   and	   a	   final	   authority	   of	   the	   CJEU	   to	   define	   the	   extent	   of	   protection	   that	   should	   be	  
attributed	   to	   the	   constitutional	   core	   of	   Member	   States’	   identity	   on	   the	   other.	   This	   would	   not	  
correspond	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  constitutional	  pluralism	  that	  has	   informed	  European	  integration	  from	  
the	  outset.	  	  
	  
Based	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	  Member	   States	   are	   still	   the	  Masters	   of	   the	   Treaties,	   the	   latter	  
should	   definitely	   have	   a	   say	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   what	   is	   to	   be	   regarded	   constitutive	   for	   their	  
respective	   constitutional	   identities.	   The	   objective	   is	   therefore	   to	   reconcile	   the	   two	   concepts	   of	  
national	   constitutional	   identity,	   one	   of	   them	   rooted	   in	   European	   and	   the	   other	   in	   national	  
constitutional	  law.	  What	  is	  proposed	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  “Constitutional	  Committee”,147	  an	  ad-­‐
hoc	  committee	  of	  representatives	  of	  national	  Constitutional	  Courts	   including	  a	  representative	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1449.	  
145	  Kumm/Ferreres	   Comella	   (supra	   note	   4)	   21	   et	   seq,	   25	   et	   seq;	   their	   proposal	   has	   to	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   TECE	  
context	  though.	  
146	  For	   instance	  Arnull,	   Judicial	   Dialogue	   in	   the	   European	  Union,	   in	   Dickson/Eleftheriadis	   (eds),	   Philosophical	  
Foundations	  of	  European	  Union	  Law,	  2012,	  109.	  
147	  Cf	  the	  proposal	  of	  a	  “Constitutional	  Council”,	  Weiler,	  To	  be	  a	  European	  Citizen	  –	  Eros	  and	  Civilization,	  WPS	  in	  
European	  Studies,	  1998,	  45	  et	  seq.	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the	  CJEU	  that	  meets	  in	  cases	  where	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  is	  invoked	  before	  the	  CJEU	  respectively	  where	  the	  
latter	   considers	   it	   necessary.	   The	   debate	   in	   the	   Committee,	   chaired	   by	   the	   representative	   of	   the	  
Member	   State,	   whose	   identity	   is	   at	   stake,	   should	   ideally	   result	   in	   a	   common	   final	   opinion.	  While	  
there	   are	  multiple	   options	   regarding	   the	   distribution	   of	   votes,	   it	   is	   essential	   that	   the	   vote	   of	   the	  
Member	  State	  who	   is	  directly	   involved	   in	  a	  case	  should	  be	  accorded	  more	  weight	   in	   relation	   to	  all	  
other	   votes.	   Another	   decisive	   feature	   is,	   that	   unlike	   the	   procedure	   before	   the	   CJEU,	   dissenting	  
opinions	  should	  be	  allowed.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  Advocate	  Generals,	  all	  opinions	  should	  
be	  published	  before	  the	  final	  judgment	  of	  the	  CJEU	  is	  adopted.	  The	  opinion	  of	  the	  Committee	  should	  
have	  a	  binding	  effect	  on	  the	  CJEU,	  comparable	  with	  that	  of	  a	  preliminary	  ruling	  on	  a	  national	  court.	  
	  
The	  proposed	  procedure	  would	  force	  the	  CJEU	  to	  accept	  the	  opinion	  of	  national	  constitutional	  courts	  
in	   their	  collectivity	  and	  result	   in	  a	  broad	  and	   intensified	   judicial	  dialogue	   instead	  of	   just	  exclusively	  
focusing	  on	  the	  constitutional	  court	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  concerned;	  the	  publication	  of	  common	  and	  
dissenting	  opinions	  would	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  differentiated	  debate	  –	  not	  only	  among	  the	  judiciary,	  
but	   ideally	   also	   including	   the	   public	   sphere.	   This	   procedure	   would	   adequately	   correspond	   to	   the	  
significance	  of	  national	  constitutional	  identity	  and	  by	  upgrading	  constitutional	  courts	  in	  the	  European	  
legal	  arena,	  it	  would	  result	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  fundamental	  interests	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  and	  
the	  Union.	  Even	  though	  at	  first	  sight	  the	  respect	  Art	  4(2)	  TEU	  calls	  for	  seems	  to	  be	  first	  and	  foremost	  
in	  the	   interest	  of	  the	  Member	  States,	   it	  only	  emerges	  at	  second	  glance	  that	  today’s	  Union,	  as	  a	  sui	  
generis	   legal	   construct,	   remains	   largely	   dependent	   on	   the	   (democratic)	   legitimacy	   of	   its	   Member	  
States.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  sincere	  cooperation,	  national	  constitutional	  courts	  would	  no	  
longer	  simply	  intervene	  from	  the	  national	  level;	  they	  would	  rather	  become	  real	  counterparts	  of	  the	  
CJEU	  on	  the	  European	  stage.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  pre-­‐clarification	  of	  delicate	  identity-­‐related	  issues	  
could	  lastingly	  strengthen	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  CJEU.	  Admittedly,	  conferring	  the	  decision	  competence	  
to	  the	  Constitutional	  Committee	  could	  imply	  that	  identity-­‐related	  limits	  to	  European	  integration	  are	  
set	  by	  the	  judicial	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  political	  branch.148	  There	  is	  nothing	  new	  in	  this	  however;	  some	  
of	   the	  most	  revolutionary	  developments	   that	  have	  coined	  European	   integration	  to	  date	  go	  back	  to	  
judicial	  hazards	  –	  one	  may	  just	  think	  of	  decisions	  such	  as	  Van	  Gend149,	  Costa	  v	  ENEL150,	  Internationale	  
Handelsgesellschaft,151 	  Frontini	   Franco, 152	  Solange, 153	  Francovich, 154	  Maastricht, 155	  Schmidberger156	  
and	   Lisbon157.	   Thus,	   constitutional	   courts	   as	   such	   are	   political	   actors.	   An	   institutionalized	   decision	  
making	   process	   would	   probably	   constitute	   the	   perfect	   trade-­‐off	   between	   the	   national	   interest	   of	  
preserving	   national	   identity	   and	   the	   European	   interest	   of	   deepening	   integration.	   Furthermore,	  
constitutional	  courts	  are	  not	  as	  much	  exposed	  to	  populist	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  politics	  as	  the	  political	  branches	  
and	  therefore	  more	  suitable	  to	  take	  serious	  decisions.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  Von	  Bogdandy/Schill	  (supra	  note	  9)	  1437.	  
149	  Case	  26-­‐62,	  van	  Gend	  &	  Loos,	  ECR	  1963,	  1.	  
150	  Case	  6-­‐64,	  Costa	  v	  E.N.E.L.,	  ECR	  1964,	  1141.	  
151	  Case	  11/70,	  Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft,	  ECR	  1970,	  112.	  
152	  Corte	  Costituzionale,	  Sent	  183/73,	  18.12.1973,	  Frontini	  Franco.	  
153	  BVerfG	  37,	  271,	  29.5.1974,	  Solange	  I.	  
154	  Joined	  Cases	  C-­‐6/90	  and	  C-­‐9/90,	  Andrea	  Francovich	  and	  Danila	  Bonifaci	  and	  others	  v	   Italian	  Republic,	  ECR	  
1991,	  I-­‐5357.	  
155	  BVerfG	  1993,	  89,	  155,	  12.10.1993,	  Maastricht.	  
156	  Case	  C-­‐112/09,	  Schmidberger,	  ECR	  2003,	  I-­‐5659.	  
157	  BVerfG,	  2	  BvE	  2/08,	  30.6.2009,	  Lisbon.	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Whereas	   this	   is	   not	   the	   place	   to	   assess	   if	   there	   are	   suitable	   legal	   bases	   in	   place	   –	   national	   and	  
European	  –	   that	   allow	   for	   the	   establishment	  of	   the	  proposed	  Constitutional	   Committee,	   there	   are	  
two	  general	  arguments	  supporting	  such	  a	  construction.	  First,	  the	  Union’s	  judicial	  system	  is	  based	  on	  
the	   cooperation	   of	   European	   and	   national	   Courts	   and	   therefore	   dual	   in	   nature158	  and	   second,	   the	  
decisions	  of	  the	  Committee	  would	  not	   interfere	  with	  the	  CJEU’s	  monopoly	  on	  the	   interpretation	  of	  
EU	  law,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  for	  the	  European	  Union	  judiciary	  to	  interpret	  national	  law.	  Therefore,	  an	  effective	  
and	  advantageous	  operationalization	  of	   the	   identity	   clause	   requires	   joint	   efforts	   and	  above	  all	   the	  
willingness	  of	  the	  CJEU	  to	  accept	  decisions	  of	  those	  institutions	  that	  are	  competent	  to	  decide;	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  national	  constitutional	   identity	   the	  CJEU	   itself	   is	  definitely	  not.	  What	   is	  also	  required	   is	   the	  
willingness	  of	  national	  constitutional	  courts	  to	   interpret	  national	  constitutional	   identity	  narrowly	   in	  
the	  sense	  of	  the	  essential	  elements	  doctrine	  of	  the	  CJEU	  as	  well	  as	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  common	  say	  of	  the	  
national	   constitutional	   courts	   in	   their	   collectivity	   on	   identity-­‐related	   issues.	   The	   certainly	   more	  
comfortable	  option	   for	   the	  CJEU	  and	  for	  national	  courts	  –	  at	   least	   in	   the	  short	   term	  –	  would	  be	  to	  
insist	   on	   their	   current	   positions.	   This	  would	   result	   in	   a	   reduction	   of	   the	   identity	   clause	   to	   a	  mere	  
symbolic	  gesture	  as	  well	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  antagonism	  between	  national	  and	  European	  courts.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  See	  Art	   19(1)	   TEU;	  Torres	   Peres	   identifies	   a	   „procedural	   obligation	  of	   dialogue“	  of	   the	  CJEU,	  Torres	   Pérez	  
(supra	  note	  83)	  155.	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